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Following Chile’s pension reform in 1981, a wave of 
multi-pillar pension reforms took place in Latin America 
(LAC). Their implementation has revealed new policy 
challenges. To shed light on these issues, this paper 
reviews the structure and performance of mandatory DC 
pillars in LAC. The review highlights three important 
points. First, it suggests overall positive outcomes from 
reforms in the LAC countries that implemented multi-
pillar pension systems. There is, however, scope for 
increasing efficiency. Second, management fees have 
declined but remain relatively high whereas decreases in 
operational costs have only been partially passed through 
to consumers reflecting inadequate competition. Limits 
on transfers and related measures have been ineffective in 
curtailing management fees but created new barriers to 
entry. In recent years, a few countries in LAC introduced 
or are in the process of introducing a combination of new 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, Latin America and Caribbean Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to analyze competition policy of multi-pillar pension systems. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at elasagabaster@
worldbank.org and mariam.dayoub@arsenalinv.com.br. 
measures that focus more directly on the two root causes 
of inadequate competition—the inelasticity of demand 
to fees and selective elimination of barriers to entry by 
facilitating unbundling of services. These new measures 
show some promise. Third, the paper’s review indicates 
that a greater diversification of pension fund portfolios 
in LAC appears to be necessary. Portfolio concentration 
owes to the adoption of strict quantitative investment 
regulations, underdeveloped capital markets and volatile 
macroeconomic environments. A gradual relaxation of 
these restrictions is now in progress in several countries. 
Regulators have become more conscious of the costs 
imposed by such regulations and macroeconomic 
conditions have improved. Greater overseas 
diversification seems inevitable given the development 
stage of local capital markets. 
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Twenty-six years ago, Chile embarked on a radical pension reform. Its mandatory 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system was replaced with a fully-funded defined contribution 
(DC) scheme – a paradigm shift that became highly influential in other emerging 
countries. Since the early 1990s, nine countries in Latin America (LAC) and eleven 
countries in Eastern Europe introduced mandatory DC schemes as part of broader multi-
pillar pension systems.
1 The details of the DC pillars and their role within the larger 
multi-pillar pension system vary across countries. All these reforms, however, aimed at 
increasing the level of funding through a mandatory individual savings pillar and 
changing the approach toward intergenerational risk sharing. In addition, high-income 
OECD countries are actively promoting the expansion of voluntary pillars through 
occupational or retail plans and, in a number of these countries, such as Australia, 




In most reformed countries in LAC and Eastern Europe, the paradigm shift was 
initially motivated by the need to reduce the fiscal pressure created by generous 
mandatory defined benefit (DB) plans. In addition, such costly systems were frequently 
characterized by low coverage.
4 In LAC, such moves coincided with increased 
macroeconomic stability and the pursuit of greater fiscal prudence after having 
experienced highly unstable times, often coupled with a decline in real GDP per capita in 
the 1980s. Countries of Eastern Europe witnessed not only a fundamental transformation 
of their societies and economies in the 1990s, but also of their retirement schemes (Fultz 
and Ruck 2000, and Müller 2002a) and many of them, including Hungary and Poland, 
decided to improve the financial health of their public pension insurance with a series of 
parametric reforms or a switch to a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) PAYG system, 
while complementing it with a mandatory private tier.
5,  6 The paradigm shift, thus, has 
reduced fiscal imbalances created by generous DB plans, facilitated portability, and, in 
                                                 
1The effective years of implementation of initial reform are: (a) LAC: Peru (1992), Argentina and 
Colombia (1994), Uruguay (1996), Bolivia and Mexico (1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa Rica (2001), and 
the Dominican Republic (2003); and (b) Eastern Europe: Hungary and Kazakhstan, (1998), Poland (1999), 
Latvia and Macedonia (2001), Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo and Lithuania (voluntary also for new 
entrants) (2002), and Slovakia (2005). 
2 Australia’s mandatory system relies solely on funded schemes, occupational or personal plans. 
3 The coverage of occupational schemes in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands is large enough 
to consider them quasi-mandatory schemes. 
4 See, for example, Aiyer (1997), Holzmann (1998) and Gill et al. (2005). 
5 With few exceptions (e.g., the Czech Republic), the transition period in Eastern Europe caused a sharp 
decline in the public revenue base due to increased informality and unemployment (World Bank 2002). At 
the same time, expenditures soared as many workers benefited from early retirement provisions and, in 
some cases, used disability insurance as a means to avoid unemployment, especially in Poland. The 
combination of these two factors resulted in high and unsustainable fiscal deficits. 
6 Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Macedonia also decided to implement a multi-pillar 
pension scheme with a mandatory funded tier, while Kosovo shifted to a large mandatory funded pillar. 
The Czech Republic and Slovenia are a few of the Eastern European countries that did not pursue a 
mandatory second tier. 
  2some cases, increased domestic savings depending on how the transition to the new 
system was financed. 
 
Experience has also revealed many policy challenges. Coverage ratios have 
generally either stagnated or declined, which has raised public concerns about the DC 
system. Other factors, however, could have a greater bearing on participation, such as 
development in the formal labor market and GDP per capita.
7 Another important 
challenge is improving the system’s efficiency in terms of administration costs and fees, 
and investment performance. In most LAC countries, management fees remain relatively 
high and declines in operational costs have not been fully passed through to consumers, 
pointing out market deficiencies. In addition, a common problem is that pension fund 
administrators (PFAs) have been unable to adequately diversify their portfolios. The 
policy debate on the performance of DC plans is intensifying and policymakers are 
exploring how to address these challenges as replacement rates could otherwise prove to 
be low or a significant share of the population could remain uncovered by the pension 
system. For example, 27 years since inception, the Chilean Congress approved in January 
2008 a reform of the country’s pension system that seeks to expand coverage and the 
investment choices made by PFAs on behalf of contributors as well as to promote greater 
competition. 
 
To shed more light on these issues and contribute to the ongoing policy debate, 
this paper reviews the structure and performance of mandatory DC schemes in LAC and, 
whenever relevant, offers comparisons with other key DC reforms undertaken in 
emerging economies and in OECD countries, in particular Sweden. The review highlights 
important points. First, broadly speaking, it suggests that there has been overall positive 
progress in pension systems in countries that implemented a shift to a multi-pillar system 
where the mandatory DC component has an important role. There is, thus, scope for 
increasing efficiency, which should have a positive impact on future replacement rates 
and reduce unnecessary welfare losses. Second, management fees have been declining 
but remain relatively high, and the cross-country data gathered indicate that decreases in 
operational costs have only been partially passed through to consumers. Third, initially, 
regulators in LAC focused on limiting transfers (to discourage marketing and sales 
agents’ costs) and imposed other legal requirements, but these measures did not prove to 
be very effective. Unintentionally, they have created new barriers to entry.  
 
In recent years, Mexico and Chile have introduced or are in the process of 
introducing a set of measures that focus more directly on the two root causes of 
inadequate competition – reducing market barriers to new entrants and the inelasticity of 
demand to fees. The latter is proving to be particularly challenging, and while increasing 
financing literacy and education is a necessary condition, it does not seem to be 
sufficient. Although the details of the approach implemented in Mexico since the early 
2000s and the new one approved in Chile vary, the two rely on the automatic assignation 
of an important share of the market (new affiliates in Chile and unallocated affiliates in 
Mexico) to the PFA(s) with the lowest fee to compensate for the high inelasticity of 
demand. (The paper presents the details regarding the two approaches.) In Mexico, the 
                                                 
7 See Rofman (forthcoming). 
  3authorities also relaxed restrictions on transfers. The combination of these measures 
accelerated the reduction in the average fee of pension funds and the profits of PFAs. The 
automatic assignation of a fraction of participants (especially those more likely to be 
inertial participants) along with measures to reduce barriers to entry could be of interest 
to other emerging countries that have implemented similar multi-pillar reforms and are 
seeking to encourage healthy competition and to overcome the problem of demand 
inelasticity. It is important that the same investment regime applies to the PFAs receiving 
the automatically assigned affiliates and other pension fund administrators in the market 
in order to have a basis of comparison and generate the incentives for the former to 
maintain good investment management. 
 
During the second half of 2007, the Law was amended in Mexico to change inter 
alia the rule for assigning unallocated affiliates from the lowest fee to the highest net rate 
of return. The new measures came into effect in March 2008. It is too premature to assess 
its impacts, but it could pose new challenges since past rates of return do not seem to be 
good predictors of future performance.  
 
The paper’s review indicates that greater diversification of pension fund portfolios 
in LAC appears to be necessary, but the pace of change should depend on country-
specific characteristics. To a large degree, portfolio concentration owes to the adoption of 
strict quantitative investment regulations (as opposed to a “prudent person rule” 
regulation) by the supervisors, in view of the high exposure of affiliates to volatile 
domestic capital markets and the lack of experienced fund managers. Over time, 
regulators have become more conscious of the costs of these restrictions on portfolio 
performance. Hence, a gradual relaxation of restrictions is in progress in many countries 
and, most significantly, in Chile. While this relaxation of quantitative restrictions needs 
to continue, the scope and pace of reforms has to be a function of the capacity of the 
pension fund managers and pension fund supervisors across countries. A relaxation of 
quantitative restrictions needs to be accompanied by a move towards a risk-based 
supervisory framework to deter principal-agent problems. Chile and Mexico are already 
piloting elements of a risk-based supervisory method and are encountering challenges 
that highlight the need to enhance the capacity of both supervisors and supervisees and 
implement such systems only when countries present the adequate conditions to do so 
effectively. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, Section II provides a description of these DC 
schemes and their present situation in terms of coverage. Section III reviews the system’s 
performance in terms of market structure, costs, and fees, followed by an assessment of 
asset allocation, portfolio diversification, and capital market development in Section IV. 
In Section V, the supervision framework and initial efforts to move toward a risk-based 






  4II.  Overview of Mandatory DC Schemes in LAC 
 
Mandatory pension schemes have had a long tradition in LAC. Chile and Uruguay 
led the way with the establishment of such systems in the early 1920s. Over the following 
half century, all other LAC countries set up mandatory schemes of their own. Mandated 
coverage varied across countries and often a multitude of separate schemes were created 
for public sector workers (e.g., Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico). Over the 
years, these schemes largely evolved into DB programs operating on a PAYG basis, 
although younger programs are still managing a modest amount of assets. 
 
In this section, the focus is on the basic features of pension funds in LAC and in 
other emerging economies, whenever relevant. It discusses some history behind the 
reform processes in LAC, presents the basic features of the structural pension reforms 
implemented in 10 LAC countries, examines the fiscal impacts of the pension reforms 
focusing on the implicit and explicit public pension debts and studies coverage using 
cross-country data. This last subsection finds a positive relationship between GDP per 
capita and pension coverage and, using data compiled by Rofman and Lucchetti (2006), it 
shows that, in general, coverage has either stagnated or declined in reformed LAC 
countries when data for the 2000s are compared with those for the 1990s due to economic 
shocks and other labor market developments. 
 
II.1.  Basic Features of Mandatory Funded Pillars 
 
A radical transformation of pension systems in LAC countries started in 1981 
when Chile moved from a PAYG to a funded scheme of mandatory individual retirement 
accounts. A decade later, the region experienced a wave of pension reforms mainly 
spurred by the need to both enhance the long-term financial sustainability of these 
schemes and improve intergenerational fairness. Other objectives were also weighed in, 
such as reducing inequities within cohorts, expanding coverage, and promoting the 
development of the domestic capital market. From 1992 through 2001, eleven additional 
countries enacted legislation that involved a transformation of purely DB PAYG schemes 
into multi-pillar structures including a mandatory DC pillar, but only nine of them in fact 
implemented the reforms (Table 1).
8, 9 Although these reforms share the introduction of 
mandatory individual retirement accounts, there are also important differences regarding 
the size and the role afforded to the different pillars, the provision of life and disability 
insurance, affiliates’ choices, the role of the state, and the institutional arrangements to 
manage the new pension schemes. 
 
Four basic structures can be distinguished according to the level of choice among 
pillars and the degree of funding of mandatory retirement income (Figure 1). In Bolivia, 
                                                 
8 Nicaragua and Ecuador enacted pension reform legislations in 2000 and 2001, respectively, but have 
never implemented the new laws. 
9 Panama is currently implementing the pension reform legislation enacted in 2006 to streamline its PAYG 
scheme and, in parallel, introduce a mandatory funded pillar to be publicly managed for high-income 
workers. Brazil has introduced changes to the PAYG schemes for public and private sector workers and 
implemented other initiatives to facilitate the growth of voluntary pension arrangements but has not 
introduced a mandatory DC pillar (World Bank forthcoming). 
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Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico, individual retirement accounts 
became the primary form of mandatory retirement income and the PAYG scheme was 
closed.
10,11 On the other hand, in Colombia and Peru, new entrants can choose between 
participating in the reformed PAYG scheme or the DC scheme. In Colombia, workers 
can switch every three years between the PAYG and the DC scheme, a fact that creates 
several problems, such as uncertainty over the future liabilities of the PAYG scheme due 
to the open-ended option for switching across schemes as well as the creation of a moral 
hazard for participants in the DC pillar who may prefer to select riskier fund options 
knowing that they can always switch back to the PAYG scheme. 
 
In Costa Rica and Uruguay, workers participate in a two-pillar system – a 
reformed PAYG scheme and a DC scheme.
12 In Argentina, all workers contribute to the 
PAYG scheme for a basic flat pension and, in addition, they can choose either a PAYG or 
a DC scheme for the complementary earnings-related component. Initially, the DC 
scheme was set as the default option for undecided workers, but following legal reforms 
in 2007, undecided workers will be automatically assigned to the public system. 
Moreover, once every five years, affiliates will be able to switch from one scheme to the 
other – the last time they can switch is prior to being 10 years apart from retirement (50 
years-old for women and 55 years-old for men). In Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, the 
PAYG schemes were significantly downsized at the time of the reform, while they 
remain fairly generous in Costa Rica and Uruguay. 
 
Financial markets and institutions administering long-term savings were largely 
undeveloped in most countries when the pension reforms were implemented. To control 
for possible risks related to the administration of mandatory workers’ savings, reformed 
LAC countries established a highly restrictive regulatory framework that required the 
creation of a specialized industry of pension providers and imposed strict quantitative 
restrictions on the asset management of pension funds by private administrators in 
contrast with the practice in OECD countries (e.g., Australia, Sweden and the UK) with 
more developed markets. As sections III and IV of the paper will show, these tight 
restrictions have posed challenges to the efficient performance of the system. 
 
The reformed systems in LAC also comprise voluntary components with similar 
design features to the mandatory component, but the former have barely taken off. In 
2002, Chile eased restrictions by expanding the market for tax-preferred voluntary 
savings to banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and housing funds (IMF and World 
Bank 2004). Chile and Mexico also eased withdrawal restrictions to encourage 
participation, and the more recent pension reform in Chile has authorized the 
development of collective schemes sponsored by employers but managed by authorized 
financial institutions and has instituted further fiscal incentives targeted at middle-income 
workers.  
 
10 In Mexico, the PAYG scheme still works as insurance for disability as well as life and labor risks. 
11 In Bolivia, the government recently announced a new pension reform that could possibly replace the two 
private pension fund administrators with a public one and could include a partial reinstatement of the 
PAYG for low income workers. Discussions on the reforms are at a preliminary stage. 
12 In Uruguay, the participation of low- and middle-income workers in the two-pillar is optional.  
Table 1: Main features of structural reforms to old-age, disability and death systems in reformed LAC countries 
Feature Chile  Peru  Colombia  Argentina  Uruguay  Mexico  Bolivia 
El 
Salvador  Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Year(s) of reform  1981  1992-1993  1994  1994  1996  1997  1997  1998  1995/2000
e  2001 
Contribution-related 
PAYG system  Closed  Remains  Remains  Remains  Remains  Closed
c Closed Closed  Remains  Closed 
Total payroll tax rate, 
pre-reform (%)  33  18  17.8     42     40       20  19  11.8     22  9.25 
Total payroll tax rate, 
post-reform (%)  20 20.5/22.0
a  33.8     46
f     40       26  24  13.5     26     20 
IRA contribution (%)  10  8       10  7.72  12.27  12.07  10       10  4.25     10 
Participation of new 
workers  Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
Participation of self-
employed workers  Mandatory  Voluntary  Voluntary  Mandatory  Mandatory  Voluntary  Voluntary  Voluntary  Voluntary  Mandatory 
Separate system for 
civil servants  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  N/A  Yes 














































pension  Yes  Yes
b  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Social assistance 
pension Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes
d  No
g  Yes Yes 
Notes: 
a20.5 percent for private pension system, 22.0 percent for national system. 
bOnly for affiliates born before 1945. 
cIn Mexico, the PAYG scheme still works 
as insurance for disability as well as life and labor risks. 
dOnly affiliates born before 1974. 
eCosta Rica introduced voluntary retirement accounts in 1996 but 
made private individual retirement saving mandatory as a complement to the DB system in 2000. 
fThe payroll tax rate was subsequently reduced during the crisis 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
gMexico has offers some non-contributory schemes at the subnational level. N/A means not available. 
Source: Adapted from Gill et al. (2005) and updated by the authors. 
  7Figure 1: Mandatory pension systems for reformed LAC countries, by type 
 




• Dominican Republic 
• El Salvador 
• Mexico 







Note: FF means fully funded. In Uruguay and Panama, the funded pillar is 
mandatory for high-income workers. 
• Costa Rica 
• Panama 
• Uruguay 
PAYG and FF System  PAYG or 
PAYG and FF System 
• Argentina
Source: Adapted from Gill et al. (2005) and updated by the authors. 
 
As a safety net, all reformed LAC countries except Peru provide a minimum 
pension guarantee on the contributory pillars for low-income workers and workers whose 
retirement benefits turn out to be low due to poor investment returns.
13 A minimum 
contributory period, usually around 20 to 25 years but as high as 35 years (in Uruguay), is 
necessary to be eligible for this guarantee. These provisions are inadequate for many 
workers given the low coverage rates as discussed below, and many countries extend social 
assistance programs to the elderly poor (Table 1).
14  
 
II.2. Fiscal  Impacts 
 
Overall, the long-run fiscal sustainability of pension systems has significantly 
increased as a result of structural reforms. According to Zviniene and Packard (2002), 
Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico showed the largest falls in the implicit pension 
debt since the reforms closed the PAYG pillar, but the implicit pension debt also declined 
in countries where a PAYG pillar was retained with the rationalization of the public pillar. 
More importantly, simulations for the total pension (explicit) debt point out to marked 
savings after the reforms, most notably in Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, and Uruguay. For 
Argentina, such simulations showed a slight increase in the public pension debt as a share 
of GDP after the reform due to the decline in employer contributions and the public policy 
of assuming pension liabilities related to provincial civil servants.
15 
 
                                                 
13 In Peru, it only applies to workers who were born before 1945. 
14 In Bolivia, all citizens who were 21 or older at the end of 1995 have the right to receive a basic pension 
when reaching 65 years-old. 
15 Simulations do not take into account the Peso devaluation of 2001-2002. See Table A1 in Appendix 1. 
  - 8 -While the trends point to a reduced cumulative pension debt over the long run, 
governments have had to deal with higher pension deficits in the short run since shifting 
from a PAYG to a funded scheme requires the repayment of implicit pension debts. Most 
countries in the LAC region have resorted to borrowing and, in some cases, to the 
privatization of revenues in order to manage the transition cost (e.g., Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Mexico). The bulk of the new explicit debt has been acquired by pension funds. Chile 
has been an exception having prepared well for the 1981 pension reform by tightening its 
fiscal policies prior to the reform to make room for its envisaged fiscal requirements.
16 
Authors such as Holzmann (1998) make the case for a mix of budgetary and debt financing 
with the split determined by the country’s circumstances to prevent a double burden on the 
transition generation. Therefore, debt financing needs to be used with caution to avoid a 
“privatization of the PAYG scheme.” Relying on debt financing can aggravate the domestic 





Expanding coverage has often been regarded as one important reason for shifting 
from the PAYG to the funded DC system. By establishing closer links between 
contributions and benefits as well as stronger property rights over future benefits through 
individual accounts, it was expected that participation in the pension system would expand. 
Increases in coverage rates, however, have remained elusive in most countries that 
implemented such structural reforms. 
 
A positive relationship between GDP per capita and pension coverage is observed, 
which holds true globally and for other LAC countries that did not undertake structural 
pension reforms (Figure 2). When the evolution of pension coverage from the mid-1990s 
(around the time that many of these reforms were undertaken in LAC) to the early 2000s is 
considered, coverage rates increased in El Salvador and Peru, but stagnated or declined in 
the other reformed LAC countries (Figure 3). Besides the design of the pension system, 
other factors played a critical role in determining participation in the system. 
 
Much of the literature argues that industry, the degree of unionization, and firm size 
are important determinants of the access of workers to pensions and the social security 
(Marquez and Pages 1998 and Mesa-Lago 2000). These factors can more than offset other 
positive effects resulting from changes in the pension design. Thus, the growing 
participation in the economy of self-employment, micro and small enterprises, and 
informality in most of these countries over the past decade have not favored coverage 
expansion (World Bank 2007).
18 Rofman and Luccetti (2006), who conducted a review of 
social security coverage in 15 LAC countries based on household surveys, confirm that 
there is a positive relationship between the coverage of wage earners and firm size – a 
                                                 
16 Debt financing in the peak years was less than 2 percent of GDP compared to a deficit of close to 5 percent 
of GDP (Holzmann 1998). 
17 See Perry and Servén (2003) for details. 
18 See World Bank (2007) for an analysis of rising informality trends in the LAC region, its plausible causes, 
and recommendations to address it. 
  - 9 -relationship that applies both to countries that underwent structural reforms and those that 
did not, such as Brazil. 
 
Figure 2: Coverage of pensions as shares of the 
working age population vs. GDP per capita for 
selected countries 
Figure 3: Coverage rates: contributors as shares of 
economically active populations for selected LAC 
countries, 1990s and 2000s (percent) 
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Note: The year for coverage data varies between 
2000 and 2005. 
Sources: World Bank (forthcoming) and WDI. 
Note: Data available are not identical across 
countries, representing the closest years to 1995 and 
2004: Argentina (1995, 2004), Bolivia (1999, 2002), 
Chile (1996, 2003), Colombia (1996, 1999), Costa 
Rica (1995, 2004),  El Salvador (1995, 2003), 
Mexico (1998, 2002), Peru (1999, 2003), and 
Uruguay (1995, 2004). 
Source: Rofman and Lucchetti (2006) 
 
Socio-demographic characteristics are also determinants of contribution patterns. 
Rofman and Luccetti (2006) confirm that there is significantly lower participation among 
younger, female and low-income workers, with the poorest quintile being practically 
excluded from the social security system in most countries. In some countries, there was an 
observed drop in the coverage of the lowest income quintile (e.g., Chile, Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, and Argentina).  
 
Several studies suggest that there is a substantial movement of individual workers 
in and out of the formal and informal sectors, rather than a pure dichotomy. This flow 
between formality and informality ultimately results in a low density of contribution 
histories for many workers (World Bank 2007). Based on data from the Mexican Social 
Security Institute (Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social, IMSS), Levy (2006) notes that 
only 11.6 percent of low-wage workers affiliated to the IMSS spent the entire previous 
nine-year period in the IMSS system. Data from the Social Security Bank (Banco de 
Previsión Social, BPS) in Uruguay confirms that there is considerable labor movement in 
and out of the formal sector (Bucheli et al. 2006). The gaps in contribution histories, even 
among some of the countries with the highest pension coverage, such as Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay, raised concerns that membership density may not be sufficient to provide 
significant replacement rates for the covered population. The 2008 reform to the Chilean 
pension system places great emphasis on expanding coverage.
19  
 
                                                 
19 See Appendix 2. 
  - 10 -III.  Highly Concentrated and Costly Markets 
 
  The long-term success of the reforms to a DC system will not only be measured in 
terms of sustainability and coverage but also on the replacement rate that they will afford 
participants. For a given contribution rate, asset management performance and fees charged 
to affiliates will be key determinants of the balances accumulated during their active years 
and the future replacement rate.
20 Despite a declining trend, fees of PFAs remain relatively 
high in most reformed countries. The industry is highly concentrated and appears to show 
less than adequate competition. The ensuing welfare losses have attracted the attention of 
the public, and policy-makers in a few of the reformed countries are exploring new ways to 
foster healthier competition. At the same time, asset portfolios tend to be highly 
concentrated, partly due to strict quantitative restrictions, and policy-makers in some of the 
reformed countries are also revaluing their investment regulations.  
 
The remainder of this section analyzes the market structure of DC systems in LAC 
and the factors affecting competition, whereas the next section analyzes portfolio 
performance. It discusses the market structure around which funded pension systems are 
organized and the factors behind the high industry concentration in LAC markets. It also 
discusses the cross-country dispersion in management fees and examines the cost and 
profitability of the pension fund industry in LAC countries, finding that its operational 
costs have significantly declined during the 2000s, but affiliates have only partially 
benefited from the decline in operational costs. Finally, it analyzes the two main factors 
explored in the literature that prevent the development of more competitive markets in 
pension fund management in LAC countries: barriers to entry and the low demand 
elasticity of affiliates. 
 
III.1. Market  Structure 
 
The introduction of mandatory privately managed individual accounts created the 
need for a new legal and regulatory framework as well as for the definition of entities that 
could manage pension funds. In view of the limited experience with pension fund 
management at the time of the reform and concerns about principal-agent problems, the 
Chilean pension law (1980) determined the creation of new financial entities with the 
exclusive purpose of managing pension funds – the PFAs. It was considered that the “sole 
purpose” pension fund manager would be easier to supervise, but the licensing and the 
requirement of PFAs to be specialized financial entities imposed entry barriers in the 
pension fund industry, which contributed to high industry concentration.  
 
Similar models that require administrators with the exclusive purpose of managing 
pension funds have been adopted in other countries in the LAC region and Eastern Europe, 
such as Hungary and Poland. This model differs from the practice of other jurisdictions 
with mandatory DC plans and more mature financial markets, such as Australia, Sweden, 
and the UK, which have permitted a wider range of financial institutions to manage DC 
plans (Bateman 2000, and Palmer 2004).  
                                                 
20Life expectancy and other factors will also affect the purchase value of an annuity at retirement. While these 
issues are also important, this paper focuses on the accumulation phase.  
  - 11 -The market for mandatory pension fund administration is fairly concentrated in 
LAC, and, for the most part, concentration has increased over time through mergers and 
acquisitions. Industry concentration is particularly high in small countries, such as Bolivia 
and El Salvador, where two PFAs cover the entire market. In Bolivia, the government 
initially granted operating licenses for two PFAs, with an exclusivity period of five years, 
through an international bidding process. A new bidding process was launched at the end of 
the exclusivity period in 2002, but the process was declared barren since there were no 
interested parties. Political uncertainties, a small market, and minimal competition between 
the two operators explain the lack of interest by third parties. In El Salvador, five pension 
fund managers were initially set up in 1998. Two years later, three of these merged and the 
license of a fourth one was revoked for operating without sufficient capital. 
 
Even in larger and more mature markets, such as Chile, there is a relatively high 
level of concentration (Figure 4 and Figure 5). In 2006, the three largest Chilean PFAs 
managed about 73 percent of pension funds assets, equivalent to about 40 percent of GDP. 
This high concentration can be related to an intensive industry consolidation in the late-
1990s.
21 Argentina and Mexico show a more diversified market, while concentration in the 
latter country as well as in Peru declined due to regulatory changes implemented in recent 
years that eased the entry of new comers. However, following the approval of the 2007 
amendment to the pension law in Mexico, the trend has been reversed and the number of 
PFAs has declined to 18. High concentration is also found in jurisdictions outside the LAC 
region with specialized pension fund administrators. In 2004, there were 75 voluntary 
pension funds in operation in Hungary from the 315 in 1998 and the six largest 
administrators accounted for 83 percent of the total assets under management (IMF and 
World Bank 2005a). In Poland, the three largest pension fund administrators accounted for 
about 64 percent of the assets under management in the system in 2005, while this share 
was about 76 percent for Slovakia in 2006 (IMF and World Bank 2007). By contrast, 
Australia, the UK, and Sweden present a far more diversified industry. That said, the 
concentration of assets under management of the world’s largest 500 fund managers has 
increased in recent years and the top 20 fund managers’ share rose from 29 percent in 1996 
to 36 percent in 2004 (International Financial Services London, 2006). 
 
Reformed LAC countries charge different administrative fees, which makes 
international comparisons among managers particularly difficult (Table 2). Corvera et al. 
(2006) analyzed comparable indicators for 67 PFAs in LAC, finding that dispersion for 
pension management charges is large, both across and within countries (Table 3 and Table 
4). Cross-country dispersion in fees can be partially explained by differences in the services 
that the pension managers are forced to provide as well as to the degree to which the 
pension system’s architecture in each country takes advantage of economies of scale. 
However, they found that intra-country fee dispersion seems to be related to lack of 
competition and the presence of state-owned managers, which tend to charge lower fees. 
 
                                                 
21 In the early 1990s, a large number of small and most inefficient operators entered the market which unleash 
an aggressive competition war and resulted in higher costs and inefficiencies. At the peak point in 1995, there 
were as many as 21 operators. The lack of viability of the small operators and changes in regulations led to a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions and, as of July 2007, six PFAs operate in Chile. 
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Figure 4: Number of PFAs in reformed LAC 
countries, 1998 and 2006 
Figure 5: Assets managed by the three largest PFAs 
as shares of total assets in reformed LAC countries, 



































































Sources: SAFJP, SPVS, SAFP, Superintendencia 
Financiera de Colombia, SUPEN, Superintendencia 
de Pensiones, Consar, SBS, and Banco Central de 
Uruguay. 
Sources: SAFJP, SPVS, SAFP, Superintendencia 
Financiera de Colombia, SUPEN, Superintendencia 
de Pensiones, Consar, SBS, and Banco Central de 
Uruguay. 
Table 2: Average administrative fees charged in LAC countries in early 2006 
Country Proportional 
charge on flows 
(% salary) 
Fixed charge 











a  --  --  --  -- 
Bolivia  0.50%       0.2285%
b  -- -- 
Chile  1.60%  $0.90  --  --  -- 
Colombia 1.57%  --  --  --  -- 
Costa Rica  0.14%  --  --  7.50%  -- 
El Salvador  1.40%  --  --  --  -- 
Mexico    1.20%
b  --  0.34%  --  -- 
Peru 1.99%  --  --  --  -- 
Dominican Republic  0.50%  --  --  --  28.57%
c 
Uruguay 2.07%  $0.26  --  --  -- 
Notes: 
aThe 2007 legal reform sets a charge ceiling of 1 percent. 
bDifferent charges apply depending on the 
fund size. 
cThe fee applies to the excess return paid over the interest rate of commercial banking cash 
deposits.
  
Source: Corvera et al. (2006). 
 
Table 3: Reformed LAC countries: 25-year equivalent fee as a share of assets under management (percent) 




 Argentina   1.18  2.54  1.36  1.62  0.38  23.40 
 Bolivia  0.56  0.56  0.00  0.56  0.00    0.00 
 Chile  0.97  1.30  0.32  1.08  0.12  11.16 
 Colombia   0.81  1.01  0.21  0.91  0.09    9.86 
 Costa Rica   0.59  1.06  0.47  0.99  0.17  16.81 
 Dominican Republic   0.94  1.15  0.20  1.14  0.08    6.71 
 El Salvador   0.86  0.86  0.00  0.86  0.00    0.00 
 Mexico   0.71  1.64  0.93  1.19  0.26  22.07 
 Peru   1.16  1.82  0.66  1.54  0.26  16.95 
 Uruguay   0.80  1.31  0.51  1.00  0.23  23.10 
Source: Corvera et al. (2006). 
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 Argentina   0.68  1.45  0.77  0.92  0.22  23.30 
 Bolivia  0.42  0.42  0.00  0.42  0.00    0.00 
 Chile  0.56  0.74  0.18  0.62  0.07  11.13 
 Colombia   0.46  0.58  0.12  0.52  0.05    9.84 
 Costa Rica   0.59  0.94  0.36  0.89  0.13  14.69 
 Dominican Republic   0.49  0.49  0.00  0.49  0.00    0.00 
 El Salvador   0.71  0.91  0.20  0.91  0.08    8.39 
 Mexico   0.48  1.08  0.60  0.78  0.16  20.36 
 Peru   0.67  1.04  0.38  0.88  0.15  16.90 
 Uruguay   0.46  0.75  0.29  0.57  0.13  23.04 
Source: Corvera et al. (2006). 
 
The pension management charges of the most expensive plans are about two to 
three times higher than the least expensive one. Corvera et al. (2006) found that Argentina, 
Mexico, and Peru offered the most expensive plans in a 25-year horizon, and Argentina, the 
Dominican Republic, and the Costa Rica offered the most expensive plans in 40-year 
horizon. Bolivia, Colombia, and El Salvador, offered the least expensive plans and 
presented low price dispersion across administrators. In these three countries, either the 
regulator or the law stipulates price ceilings that have largely become price floors.
22 
Corvera et al. (2006) showed that fees have stagnated over the years and are unlikely to 
decline in the medium term due to insufficient competition, especially in El Salvador and 
Bolivia where there is a duopoly market structure. 
 
Mandatory DC funds in other emerging countries that have structures similar to 
those of DC plans in the LAC region also face high fees; in contrast, OECD fees are 
usually lower. In Poland, total fees amount to 160 basis points of assets, an outcome largely 
due to a highly regulated fee structure, but are expected to decline to 50-60 basis points by 
2020 due to the caps and asset growth (IMF and World Bank 2006). The total fees charged 
by Hungarian pension fund managers are around 190 basis points of assets but expected to 
decline to about 50 basis points by 2025 (Rocha and Hinz 2007). The Swedish pillar, in 
operation since 2000, charges fees of about 77 basis points and authorities expect these fees 
to decline to less than 30 basis points by 2025 (Rocha and Hinz 2007). These charges 
compare to 50 and 100 basis points for large US occupational funds and mutual funds, 
respectively. The average fee for stock funds, bond funds, and money market funds – more 
relevant comparators given the portfolio structure of pension funds in LAC – hover around 
30-70 basis points (Table 5). The annual fees charged by the Thrift Savings Plan in the US 





                                                 
22 The 2007 legal reform in Argentina sets a charge ceiling of 1 percent on workers’ salaries that has largely 
become a price floor. 
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Fees  and  expenses  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  Stock Funds 
Load fees (annualized)    30    25    24    23    22    22 
Expense ratio
    98    99  100    99    95    91 
Total  fees  and  expenses  128 124 124 122 117 113 
  Bond Funds 
Load fees (annualized)    27    22    20    20    20    20 
Expense ratio
    76    74    73    74    72    70 
Total fees and expenses  103    97    93    94    92    90 
  Money Market Funds 
Load fees (annualized)  n .a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Expense ratio    49    47    45    43    42    41 
Total fees and expenses    49    47    45    43    42    41 
Notes: Fees measured as asset weighted averages. The expense ratio is the amount of expenses that a fund 
charges its shareholders every year. n.a. means not available. 
Source: Investment Company Institute (2006). 
 
III.2.  Expenses and Profits 
 
Overall, there has been a 
dramatic decline in the operational costs 
of the pension fund industry (Table 6), 
accompanied by increasing returns on 
equity to fund managers but smaller 
changes in the fees charged to 
affiliates.
23 Operational expenses per 
contributor show even greater dispersion 
across countries than fees. In Argentina, 
they are about five times higher than in 
Bolivia. Expenditures were particularly 
high in the early years of the reform due 
to small asset and affiliate bases as well 
as important inception-related costs, 
such as marketing costs incurred by 
pension fund managers with the hiring 
of sales agents to attract affiliates, and 
restrictions imposed by regulators on transfers of affiliates across PFAs.
24 Marketing costs 
remain high in many countries and, in 2006, they accounted for about 26 and 11 of total 
operating expenses of pension fund managers in Mexico and Argentina, respectively, but 
have declined substantially in Chile to 4 percent (AIOS 2006). In contrast with most LAC 
systems, marketing costs as a share of total operating costs in Hungary have been small 
(about 2.1 percent of the total operating costs in 2004).
25 
Table 6: Reformed LAC countries: Operational 
expenses of PFAs, 2000 and 2006 




  2000 2006 2000 2006 
Argentina  75.80  26.95  3.12  1.04 
Bolivia  18.16    5.48  1.37  0.24 
Chile  34.52  38.37  0.60  0.33 
Colombia  n.a. 39.56 n.a.  1.66 
Costa Rica  n.a.  16.72  n.a.  2.53 
El  Salvador  76.43 17.34 13.44  0.74 
Mexico  42.22  25.55  4.34  1.43 
Peru 31.32  39.54  2.60  1.08 
Dominican Rep.  n.a.    8.35  n.a.  1.88 
Uruguay 53.14  20.69  3.79  0.58 
Total  48.34  28.18  2.27  0.96 
Mean 47.37  23.85  4.18  1.15 
Std. deviation  22.32  12.46  4.29  0.73   




                                                 
23 Lasaga and Pollner (2003), for example, analyze the case of Peru. 
24 See Table A2 and Table A3 in Appendix 1. 
25 It is possible that some marketing activities are performed by other companies in the same financial group 
and the associated costs are hidden in the asset management fee (IMF and World Bank 2005a, page 16). 
  - 15 -The pension industry has been enjoying exceptionally high rates of return on equity 
(ROE) in many reformed LAC countries (Table 7). This result is not surprising, as the 
pension fund industry is primarily an asset management business with relatively low capital 
requirements. Also, declines in operating expenses over time (particularly marketing costs) 
were only partially passed to members as lower fees. In Chile, for example, after 1997, 
operating costs significantly fell due to reduced expenditures in marketing services; the 
decrease in fees was substantially smaller leading to a remarkable increase in PFAs’ ROEs, 
which reached 51 percent in 2000. ROEs started to fall thereafter partly to absorb an 
increase in insurance premiums. In El Salvador, a small country with a duopoly market, the 
ROE in 2005 was as high as 38.8 percent.  
 
Table 7: Annual results of pension fund administrator in reformed LAC countries as shares of assets under 
management, 2000 and 2006 (basis points) 
Country Fees  Costs  Operating  Profits 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 
Argentina    428  121    312  104  120    17 
Bolivia    121   55    137    24    23    58 
Chile     89    69    60    33    29    36 
Colombia n.a.  149  n.a.  166  n.a.    89 
Costa Rica  n.a.  283  n.a.  253  n.a.    33 
El Salvador  2,058  141  1,344    74    33    66 
Mexico    537  189    434  143  103    45 
Peru    471  118    260  108  212    10 
Dominican Republic  n.a.  301  n.a.  188  n.a.  114 
Uruguay    346   94    379    58    -7    36 
Note: n.a. means not available. 
Source: AIOS (2006). 
 
By contrast, ROEs have decreased in Mexico since 2002 when competition started 
to increase as a result of regulations based on low cost for automatically assigning workers 
who do not select a pension fund manager and reduced restrictions on transfers across 
PFAs. Similarly, the ROE has been declining in Peru since 2004 mostly due to regulatory 
changes that encouraged the entry of new operators (Figure 6). Hungarian and Polish PFAs 
have also been able to recover their start-up costs within relatively a few years and to 
generate high ROEs recently. For example, the ROE of Polish PFAs was 22 percent in 
2004 and 24 percent in 2005 (Rudolph and Rocha 2007). Moreover, the average ROEs of 
pension fund administrators have been higher than the average ROE of banks (except for 
Mexico), which are subject to stricter capital requirements, manage a more complex 
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Figure 6: Selected LAC countries: Return on equity 
of PFAs, 1995-2005 (percent) 
Figure 7: Selected countries: Return on equity of 
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Source:  AIOS.  Sources: AIOS, Bankscope, Fitch Ratings (2007), 
IMF and World Bank (2005a). 
III.3.  What Factors Explain the High Fee Structure of PFAs? 
 
  A body of literature has emerged trying to explain the factors that impede the 
development of more competitive markets in pension fund management in LAC countries. 




Barriers to Entry 
 
Several factors have impaired the development of more competitive markets and the 
entry of new PFAs despite both the high yields on net worth in most LAC countries and 
operations that are less risky than those taken by other financial institutions. Restrictions on 
affiliates’ transfers have created market barriers by making it more difficult for new 
entrants to capture a number of affiliates that is large enough so they can attain an optimal 
operating size. There are other legal barriers that require a minimum entry capital and, in 
several reformed LAC countries, a reserve fund to back up the minimum rates of return on 
investments of pension funds.
27, 28, 29 In a few LAC countries, the law prohibits banks (e.g., 
Chile and El Salvador) and insurance companies (e.g., El Salvador) from managing pension 
funds. This prohibition was imposed because there were concerns about potential conflicts 
of interest, such as the cross-selling of products, and excessive concentration of assets in a 
few institutions. Nevertheless, it can leave potential new-comers with relevant experience 
in financial asset management outside the industry. In Mexico, the law stipulates that 51 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Barrieros and Bussofiane (2001), García and Rodríguez (2002), Apella and Maceira 
(2004), Marinovic and Valdés (2004), Melendez (2004), Berstein and Ruiz (2005), Valdés (2005), Aguilera et 
al. (2006), and Masías and Sanchez (2006). 
27 Minimum capital requirements vary across countries. In Mexico, the requirement is one of the highest in 
the region (US$2.5 million). In, Chile, it is much lower, about US$130,000, increasing with the number of 
affiliates and subjected to a ceiling of US$500,000 (World Bank 2006). 
28 In LAC, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay impose relative minimum rates of 
return on investments of pension funds. 
29 In Mexico, there is no minimum rate of return, but the law requires PFAs to keep a reserve of 0.8 percent of 
the assets under management for basic funds ad one percent for voluntary and complementary contributions. 
Reserves would be used to compensate the fund in case there were losses related to regulatory violations. 
  - 17 -percent of the capital of a pension fund manager has to be Mexican.
30 This limit is waived 
for financial institutions from countries with which Mexico has international agreements, 
and they can set up a pension fund manager as a subsidiary. Nonetheless, the literature 
points out to other sources of barriers to entry. 
 
The institutional design of pension systems has not allowed the industry to benefit 
from economies of scale in the provision of certain services and has favored personal 
contact (sales agents) as the main distribution channel, which has resulted in competition 
via costly sales forces. A number of studies with varying methodologies have been 
undertaken to estimate the cost function of the pension fund industry. Barrieros and 
Bussofiane (2001) and Marinovic and Valdés (2004) for Chile, Apella and Maceira (2004) 
for Argentina, and Melendez (2004) for Mexico found that there are significant economies 
of scale in the industry. The estimates of Marinovic and Valdés (2004) also suggest that, 
without marketing costs, the minimal efficiency scale declines substantially from about one 
million contributors (or 2 million affiliates) to about 150,000 contributors (or 300,000 
affiliates).
31 Apella and Maceira (2004) found that economies of scale in the Argentinean 
pension industry declined after 1997 in response to a regulatory change regarding the 
transfers of affiliates across PFAs, but remain significant. For Mexico, Melendez (2004) 
found that the minimum efficiency scale is close to 1.15 (1.05) million affiliates for 
pension fund managers that do (not) belong to a financial conglomerate. Nevertheless, 
Aguilera et al. (2006) suggest that previous studies used mis-specified cost curves. Using a 
semi-parametric cost function, they found that economies of scale are low in Mexico (about 
800,000 affiliates or 2 percent of the market share) and that the industry has dramatically 
reduced its costs since 2002 when a series of regulatory changes to promote competition in 
fees started to be implemented.
32 
 
The unbundling of services would allow for a better use of economies of scale in 
basic administrative services, reduce barriers to entry for financial management, and boost 
competition. Several studies have argued for the unbundling of services, in particular 
separating financial management, which presents low economies of scale, from the 
collection, record-keeping, and provision of information to affiliates, which show high 
economies of scale. Valdés (2005) proposes a bidding process to select operators to provide 
basic administrative services under a 10-year concession contract with different regional 
coverage, which would allow for price comparability. But he discourages the establishment 
of a central operator by PFAs to prevent the creation of a cartel that could set/impose fees 
for its services substantially above its costs. In addition, the creation of new distribution 
channels could also assist workers in the search for pension fund managers through a 
bidding process. Valdés (2005) proposed that these distribution channels would reduce 
economies of scale associated with marketing costs and, in turn, decrease entry barriers in 
                                                 
30 For example, the shareholders of the Mexican Afore Bancomer are: the Mexican financial institution 
Bancomer  (51 percent), Aetna International (33 percent), the multinational financial services institution 
BBVA (11.2 percent), and the Chilean PFA Provida (4.8 percent). 
31 Contributors refer to individuals who are registered and are paying into the fund; affiliates may be either 
unemployed or do not pay their contributions. 
32 Aguilera et al. (2006) found that production costs fell by 30 percent between 1999-2001 and 2002-2004. 
  - 18 -the industry. This research influenced the reform approved by the Chilean Congress in 
January 2008, which established a bidding mechanism for affiliates joining the system. 
 
Is the Elasticity of Demand Low? 
 
A well functioning market for retail DC plans requires informed consumers that 
react to relevant price parameters, such as administrative fees and real rates of return. 
These were the implicit assumptions when mandatory DC plans were implemented in 
emerging economies. Preliminary evidence, however, suggests inadequately informed 
affiliates and low elasticity of demand with respect to commissions. Twenty-five years 
after the reform, affiliates in Chile remain unapprised of critical factors in the system. 
Based on the 2004 the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Previsión Social, EPS), only 
50 percent of respondents claimed to know their pension account balances and less than 2 
percent knew about their PFA’s fixed and/or variable commissions (Arenas de Mesa et al. 
2006). Such comprehensive surveys are not yet available throughout LAC, but one can 
presume that other countries in region face similar challenges. Affiliates, especially new 
members to the system, also display a passive behavior. In Argentina, around 80 percent of 
new affiliates were assigned by the pension supervisory agency in 2006.
33 In Mexico, 
about 70 percent of new affiliates were automatically assigned to an Afore by Consar in 
2006. Similarly, as of April 2007, around 70 percent of the Chilean system’s 8.63 million 
affiliates had been automatically assigned by the regulator. 
 
Although few studies on demand elasticity have been conducted, results generally 
point to low elasticity. Berstein and Ruiz (2005) estimated the demand elasticity in the 
Chilean pension system using two panels of data covering 1995-1997 and 1998-2002. In 
the first period, featured by aggressive competitive strategies through sale agents, net 
transfers were found to be positively (negatively) correlated with differentials in rates of 
return (commissions). The number of sales agents increased (decreased) the elasticity of 
demand to rates of return (commissions). In the second period, after new regulations come 
into effect reducing the both the number of salesmen and transfers across PFAs, parameters 
related to fees and commissions were not found to be significantly related to the elasticity 
of demand. Thus, the massive number of salesmen during 1995-1997 helped to increase the 
elasticity towards price variables, in particular rates of return, but at a high cost. 
 
In Mexico, affiliates seem to be particularly sensitive to marketing strategies of 
PFAs. García and Rodríguez (2002) estimated the demand elasticity function for Mexico 
and found that the only significant parameters were those related to marketing, while those 
related to fees and rates of return were neither significant nor significantly different from 
zero. Melendez (2004) found an affiliate’s decision to transfer her accounts across Mexican 
PFAs to be highly associated with the sales efforts of the manager and less associated with 
fees and rates of return; but he points out that the importance of these two last factors has 
significantly increased over time. By contrast, in Peru, positive and significant correlations 
between the elasticity of demand and the number of sales agents and price variables were 
found (Masías and Sanchez 2006). 
 
                                                 
33 The 2007 legal reform defined the PAYG as the default option for undecided workers. See Appendix 3. 
  - 19 -Improving the literacy of workers and making more information available could 
help to increase the elasticity of demand with respect to price variables.
34 In recent years, 
several agencies, in particular the Chilean Superintendence of Pension Fund Administrators 
(Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, SAFP) and the Mexican 
Consar have made efforts to improve the information provided to affiliates by PFAs, and 
their websites present a vast amount of information that can be easily accessed by affiliates. 
In Mexico, for instance, the account statement sent by the managers to affiliates compared 
commissions and rates of return in the industry and it now includes information on the “net 
rate of return.” For the most part, however, information provided to members is less than 
adequate across the LAC region and far more can be done in educating workers. 
 
IV.  The Determinants of Overly Concentrated Pension Fund Portfolios 
 
Pension fund assets in the LAC countries that implemented DC pillars have grown 
and continue to grow at a rapid pace, but portfolios remain overly concentrated which can 
affect rates of return and thus future replacement rates. This section reviews portfolio 
composition and performance and examines the factors that have led to such portfolio 
concentration.  
 
IV.1.  Rapid Asset Growth 
 
The growth of pension fund 
assets in LAC has been impressive. In 
Chile, the pioneer reformer in LAC, 
assets managed by pension funds 
reached almost 58 percent of GDP in 
2005 (Figure 8). The average for other 
LAC countries that implemented 
structural pension reforms has already 
reached 18 percent of GDP (Figure 9). 
When OECD countries are considered, 
only 11 out of its 30 members had larger 
pension assets as shares of GDP in 2005 
than the LAC average (Figure 10). At 
least two factors can be related to this asset growth: (a) in some countries, such as El 
Salvador, coverage has expanded in the 2000s, and (b) contribution rates (as shares of 
wages).
 This increasing trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future and rates of 
return are expected to be the main driving source of growth.
35 In 2015, assets in the funded 
pension systems as shares of GDP are projected to reach around 90 percent in Chile, 44 
percent in Bolivia, 31 percent in Argentina, 28 percent in Peru, 26 percent in Mexico, 25 
percent in Colombia and 13 percent in Uruguay (Palacios 2003). 



















Source: Based on data from FIAP, SAFP, and WDI.
 
 
                                                 
34 See Appendix 4. 
35 See, for example, Davis (2003) and OECD (2006b). 
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Figure 9: Selected emerging markets: Pension fund 
assets as shares of GDP, 2001 and 2005 (percent) 
Figure 10: Selected OECD countries: Pension fund 















































































Source: Based on data from FIAP, WDI, and OECD.  Source: OECD. 
IV.2.  Overly Concentrated Portfolios 
 
The asset allocation of pension funds in reformed LAC countries, except for Chile, 
the Dominican Republic, and Peru, remains concentrated on government securities; 
although there has been an overall improvement in portfolio diversification. In 1999, with 
the exception of Peru, pension funds were invested almost exclusively in instruments 
issued by the public and the financial sectors. Data for 2006 show that PFAs in LAC 
(excluding Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica) increased the allocation of their portfolios in 
instruments issued by the public sector and, with regard to securities issued by other 
sectors, a wider set of instruments is being used (Figure 11 and Figure 12). 
 
The only country in LAC where asset allocation of pension funds is relatively well 
diversified is Chile. Over the past 25 years, it has changed significantly, mainly due to 
relaxations of the investment regime and the domestic capital market development. 
Initially, pension funds were allowed to be invested only in domestic fixed-income 
instruments. In 1985, funds were allowed to invest in domestic equities, a regulatory 
change that took place in order to have their participation in the country’s privatization of 
public utilities. In 1990, investment limits were further relaxed and pension funds were 
allowed to be invested in foreign-issued instruments, whose participation in their portfolios 
has been increasing since then. Nevertheless, the share of funds invested in foreign-issued 
assets remained low considering the relatively small size and low diversification of the 
Chilean economy. To address it, the 2008 reform further liberalizes foreign restrictions.
36 
 
In contrast, the allocation of pension funds in OECD countries tends to be 
concentrated in corporate bonds and stocks, which usually represent more than half of their 
portfolios, except for Hungary and Poland. Investments in mutual funds are particularly 
important for Canadian, English, and American pension funds, while the asset allocation of 
pension funds to government bonds respond for less than 25 percent of their portfolios. The 
                                                 
36 For Fund A, it increases the potential ceiling to as much as 100 percent. On the basis of the parameters set 
in the law, the Central Bank will issue a regulation specifying the specific foreign ceiling for each fund and 
the percent applying to the aggregate investment of the five funds.  
  - 21 -two exceptions are Hungary and Poland, where pension funds allocate more than 60 
percent of their assets to government securities (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 11: Selected LAC countries: Portfolio composition of pension funds by sector issuer (percent) 
(a) 1999  (b) 2006 
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Figure 12: Chile: Portfolio composition of pension 
funds, 1981-2006 (percent) 
Figure 13: Selected OECD countries: Portfolio 




















Government Bonds Mortgage Bonds



















Government Bonds Corporate Bonds Time Deposits
Equities Mutual Funds Others
Source: SAFP.  Source: OECD. 
Overall, pension funds in reformed LAC countries have posted reasonable rates of 
return on their investments. For the period 2000-2006, real rates of return varied 
significantly within and across LAC countries. In 2006, the annual real rates of return since 
the systems’ inceptions were between 6.7 percent (in Costa Rica) and 11.8 percent (in 
Uruguay) (Table 8). These numbers compare favorably with those of developed countries. 
For example, the real rates of return generated by UK pension funds in the past four years 
averaged 14 percent in 2003, 8 percent in 2004, 17 percent in 2005 and an estimated 7 
percent in 2006. Over the 44 years since 1963, UK pension funds have generated real 
annual returns averaging 4.5 percent (International Financial Services London  2007). 
Comparisons of rates of return between pension funds and domestic benchmarks are a 
difficult task. Auguste and Artana (2006), controlling for regulatory differences, evaluate 
the performance of PFAs in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. They found that the real 
return on individual contribution accounts in these countries were higher than those of 
hypothetical distribution systems. In addition, historical rates of return of PFAs compare 
relatively well with other domestic investment options when adjusted for risk. 
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Country  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Since  inception 
Argentina    3.9  -10.4  31.0  11.1    4.6    4.6  14.0    9.8 
Bolivia  10.9   14.7  15.5    7.9    5.7    3.5    2.8    8.8 
Chile    4.4     6.7    3.0  10.5    8.9    4.6  17.0  10.2
a 
Colombia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.4  19.0    6.6    6.9 
Costa Rica  n.a.  n.a.    7.1    9.8    2.5    4.1  11.3    6.7 
El Salvador    7.9     7.7    2.4    4.8    2.3    1.5    1.2    8.8 
Mexico    7.2     6.1    4.7    6.2    4.5    8.0    8.4    7.8 
Peru -6.7    11.1  11.2  21.2    5.6  18.4  26.8    9.9 
Dominican Rep.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -3.8    9.0  n.a.  n.a. 
Uruguay    7.1     5.5  40.6  27.6    6.6    4.6    9.8  11.8 
Poland  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.0    9.4  14.2    9.8  n.a. 
Notes: 
aFor Fund C. n.a. means not available. 
Source: AIOS and FIAP. 
 
IV.3.  Factors Conditioning Asset Allocation 
 
IV.3.1. Investment Regulations 
 
Regulations on investments of pension funds in LAC have followed the rigid 
quantitative criteria set by regulatory bodies, while high-income OECD countries have 
adopted a behaviorally-oriented approach known as the “prudent person rule.”
37  A 
quantitative regulation is simply defined as a quantitative limit on holdings of a given asset 
class. Typically, instruments whose holding is limited are those with high price volatility 
and/or low liquidity (Davis 2001). The adoption of a regulatory framework based on the 
quantitative criteria has five main reasons: (a) reformed pension systems are the core of the 
social security systems in several emerging economies, which makes contributors more 
exposed to capital market volatility, (b) the lack of experience of fund managers and the 
absence of adequate risk assessment tools, which may lead pension funds to take undue 
risk, (c) underdeveloped domestic capital markets may put the sustainability of the pension 
reform at risk, (d) the transition cost to a fully funded system may be prohibitively high, 





In emerging markets, countries that reformed their pension systems have opted for a 
mix of strict quantitative limits combined with some prudent guidelines. In LAC and some 
Eastern European countries quantitative limits – per instrument, per issuer, per group of 
instruments, and per risk factor – are the core of the regulatory framework, being combined 
with some form of behaviorally-oriented guidance (e.g., diversification requirements, 
                                                 
37 The reasons that justify such quantitative regulations are: (a) for most contributors, the financial resources 
in their individual accounts are their only financial assets and perhaps the largest assets they will manage to 
accumulate during their entire working life (Bolok 2003), and (b) regulation aims to create an environment in 
which asset management can obtain the highest rates of return at acceptable levels of risk. See Appendix 6. 
38 For a summary of the pros and cons of adopting quantitative limits, see Candia (1998). 
39 Vittas (1996) argues that portfolio restrictions might be necessary in the initial stages of pension reforms 
when there is a lack of qualified asset managers and capital markets lack strength and transparency. 
  - 23 -conflicts of interest, and ownership concentration limits).
40 Figure 14 and Table 9 show 
quantitative investment limits by instrument for selected emerging economies. 
 
Investment regulations have been used by governments in countries that reformed 
their pension systems as mechanisms to achieve policy objectives unrelated with the social 
security system. Several emerging economies have imposed investment floors on the 
investments of pension funds, which have been regarded as even greater sources of 
distortion of portfolio diversification and performance of investments than quantitative 
ceilings. In Uruguay, investment floors on government securities aimed at easing the fiscal 
cost of the transition to a funded pension system. In Costa Rica and El Salvador, these 
regulations aimed at providing housing finance while offering PFAs attractive long-term 
investments. An investment floor on inflation-linked securities was imposed in Mexico for 
Basic Fund 1 (Siefore) aimed at ensuring a stable real rate of return to contributors.
41 In 
Argentina, the 2007 pension reform instituted a requirement to invest a minimum of 5 
percent and a maximum of 20 percent of the portfolio on debt instruments that support 
productive or infrastructure projects in Argentina. In Bolivia, there is no specific 
investment floor, but the two PFAs are required to buy for 15 years (i.e., 1998-2013), in 
proportionate shares, up to 180 million per year in government securities that are directly 
sold by the government at pre-defined terms (Table 10). 
 
Figure 14: Investment limits by type of fund per instrument, August 2007 (percentage of fund assets) 
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Some emerging economies have started to recognize that strict quantitative 
regulations have imposed significant costs on the asset allocation strategies of pension fund 
managers and have been gradually allowing for greater diversification.
42 Policies to address 
portfolio diversification constraints in emerging markets include the relaxation of the 
                                                 
40 Quantitative limits have been relaxed in some LAC countries as their respective regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks were established or reformed to ensure a proper functioning of capital markets.  
41 See Appendix 7. 
42 For Chile, Berstein and Chumacero (2006a) constructed a (conservative) counterfactual scenarios for the 
evolution of total assets and returns that pension fund managers would have administered had the quantitative 
regulation been absent (during 1987-2002). They found that the costs have been high and that in the absence 
of such limits: (a) total assets under management could have been at least 10 percent higher, (b) investment 
limits may have been binding about 90 percent of the times, (c) affiliates might have been exposed to more 
volatility, and (d) each affiliate lost, on average, US$500 to US$1,000.  
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investment regime combined with the implementation of multi-fund schemes. In terms of 
investment limits, the main trends have been: (a) allowing for a wider set of instruments in 
which pension funds may invest, (b) decreasing the limits imposed on fixed-income 
instruments, especially government bonds, and (c) increasing the limits for variable-income 
and foreign-issued instruments. A recent trend in individual accounts schemes is the 
introduction and expansion of investment alternatives to contributors. In emerging markets, 
this trend has been realized through the creation of multi-fund schemes, which allow 
affiliates to choose among different funds with different risk profiles based on their life 
cycles. In LAC, Chile has been the pioneer in relaxing the investment regime governing 
pension funds and implementing a multi-fund scheme. Changes in Mexico, albeit more 
gradual, are also worth mentioning. Mexico allowed two funds in 2002 and five since 2007, 
a change that was combined with the gradual relaxation of quantitative investment 
restrictions and a value at risk measure. In 2005, Peru also introduced a multi-fund 
framework and has thus far allowed three types of funds. 
 
The Case of Chile 
 
First, in Chile, since the enactment of the pension law in 1981, the investment 
regime has evolved in order to allow managers to increase the depth and breadth of the 
asset allocation of pension funds across asset classes. The recent legal reform opened the 
way for further liberalizing the investment regime.
43 Nevertheless, the regulatory regime 
remains fairly complex.
44 Figure 15 shows the evolution of investment limits in Chile by 
group of instruments and how pension fund administrators have in fact taken advantage of 
the gradual relaxations of the regulatory regime for the period 1981-2001. 
 
Until March 2000, PFAs in Chile managed only one fund (Fund 1). Since then, 
another fund (Fund 2) was introduced in the system – but its resources could only be 
invested in fixed-income instruments. In August 2002, an amendment to the law 
established the multi-fund scheme and each PFA was required to offer four different funds 
(B, C, D and E) with the option of offering a fifth one (Fund A).
45 Under this new set, 
contributors have to choose the fund(s) that best fits their risk-return preferences and can 
place their balances in up to two of the five funds offered by each PFA. If affiliates do not 
choose the fund(s) in which they want to invest their contributions within a 90-day period 
after joining the system, they are automatically assigned to funds B, C or D depending on 
their age. The reform approved in January 2008 keeps the five fund structure but relaxes 
quantitative restrictions, especially on foreign securities. As of December 2006, 78 percent 
of active contributors to the Chilean pension system were enrolled in Funds B and C, the 
result of both automatic assignation rules and affiliates’ choices. The age distribution of 
members across the five funds is consistent with the objective of the multi-fund regime: 
young affiliates were primarily enrolled in Funds A and B (riskier), middle-aged affiliates 
in Fund C, and older affiliates in Funds D and E (more conservative) (Table 11). 
 
                                                 
43 The specific investment regime will be issued by the regulator (and the Central Bank in the case of foreign 
investments) on the basis of the quantitative parameters set in the law 
44 For a more detailed analysis on the evolution of the regulatory regime in Chile (see SAFP 2007). 




Table 9: Investment limits per instrument for selected emerging markets, August 2007 (percentage of fund assets) 
Instrument  Argentina
a Bolivia
a  Colombia Costa  Rica




Fixed-Income                 
Public Sector         80       
   State issued  50  No limit  No limit  75    60  No limit  No limit 
      Central Bank        50  30       
      Central Government          50       
   Decentralized institutions  30  10  20    20  30    40 
Financial Institutions    60  72           
   Deposits and bonds  30  50  32  Bonds: 10  40
  30 No  limit   
   Mortgage bonds  40  50  40    60  30  25  40 
Corporate Sector               
   Bonds  50  45  30  70  40  45  10  40 
Variable-Income                 
   Stocks  50  40  30  10  20  45
b  Listed: no limit 
Non-listed: 10 
47.5 
   Investment funds  20  15  10  10  20    50  25 
Foreign Investment    12  20      15 
c  5 
   Fixed-income                 
      State issued/Decentralized institutions  10            10   
      Corporate sector  10            10   
   Variable-income        10         
Hedging  10           5   
Others  30  5      10       
Notes: 
aMinimum investment limits are also imposed. 
bRefers to (a) securities issued by public and private companies and shares in domestic investment 
funds (25 percent) and a maximum in fixed and variable income securities issued by private companies (20 percent). 
cWithin investments made abroad, the 
ratio of investments made in non-OECD countries shall not exceed 20 percent. 
dRefers to open pension funds (OPF). 
Sources: SAFJP, SPVS, Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público de Colombia, SUPEN, Consar, Banco Central del Uruguay and OECD (2006a). 
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Country  Description of investment floor regulations 
Argentina  The 2007 pension reform instituted a requirement to invest a minimum of 5 percent and a 
maximum of 20 percent of the portfolio on debt instruments that support productive or 
infrastructure projects in Argentina. 
Costa Rica  Minimum of 15 percent of pension funds must be invested in mortgage securities, with 
returns of at least the average return of the mandatory complementary pension system. 
El Salvador  Minimum of 30 percent of pension funds must be invested in securities issued by the Social 
Housing Fund (Fondo Nacional de Vivienda, FSV) in the 1
st year of the system’s operation, 
decreasing by 1 or 2 percent per year until reaching 10 percent from the 15
th year on. 
Mexico   Minimum of 51 percent of pension funds assets must be invested in inflation-linked or 
inflation protected securities (only for Basic Fund 1). 
Uruguay  Pension funds must invest 40 to 60 percent of their assets in government securities. 
Sources: SPVS, SUPEN, El Salvador’s Pension Supervisor, OECD (2006a), Banco Central del Uruguay. 
 
Figure 15: Chile: Investment limits and observed portfolios, 1981-2001 (percent) 
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Source: Based on data from SAFP and on Berstein and Chumacero (2006a). 
 
Table 11: Chile: Average age, wage, balance and size per fund, December 2006 
Indicator    Fund    
  A  B  C  D  E 
Average age (years)         32       30       44       58         47 
Average wage (1,000 Pesos)       514     322     345     355       395 
Average balance (1,000 Pesos)  13,745  3,137  6,311  6,697  10,941 
Number of affiliates (1,000)       861  3,443  3,320     760         57 
Number of active contributors (1,000)       548  1,462  1,252     176         36 
Source: SAFP. 
 
The asset allocation of Chilean 
pension funds is consistent with the 
objectives of multi-fund schemes. The 
risk-return decreases systematically 
from Fund A to Fund E (Table 12). As 
of December 2006, Fund A, which was 
designed to offer the highest risk-return 
combination, allocated the largest shares 
of its assets in foreign assets (53.1 
percent) and domestic equity (22.2 percent). Fund E, known as the “safe fund,” allocated 
its assets almost exclusively in domestic fixed-income instruments (99.7 percent). Fund C 
Table 12: Chile: Real annual rate of return per fund, 
2002-2006 (percent) 
Fund 2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 
A   0.68
a  26.94  12.86  10.71  22.25 
B -0.52
a  16.02  10.26    7.32  18.83 
C  2.98  10.55    8.86    4.58  15.77 
D   -1.03
a    8.94    6.80    2.84  11.46 
E  8.90    3.34    5.44    0.94    7.44   
Notes: 
a Period October 2002 to December 2002.  
Source: SAFP . 
  27still accounts for about 45 percent of the total assets managed by the six PFAs and 
remains reasonably conservative with a small share of its assets allocated in domestic 
equity (around 20 percent) and a large share invested in fixed-income instruments (almost 
60 percent) (Table 13). These portfolio compositions are related, to some degree, to the 
regulatory framework aforementioned. Dayoub et al. (forthcoming), analyzing data on 
asset allocation of Chilean pension funds from July 1996 to December 2005, found that 
while investment restrictions at the macro level for domestic instruments do not seem to 
be constraining the asset allocation of pension funds, quantitative restrictions for 
investments in foreign instruments imposed high costs on their asset allocation. In 




Table 13: Chile: Portfolio composition of pension funds, by fund and instrument, December 2006 (percent) 
Source: SAFP. 
Instrument     Fund     
  A  B  C  D  E 
Claims on the Public Sector           4.3         10.3         19.6         31.5         31.7 
  Central Bank of Chile           2.8           6.6         13.3         21.7         14.2 
  Central Government           0.6           1.3           2.4           3.5           2.7 
  Recognition bonds           0.9           2.4           3.9           6.3         14.8 
Claims on the Financial Sector         20.2         24.8         28.5         15.1         46.3 
  Mortgage bonds           1.3           2.7           5.4           8.0         18.3 
  Time deposits         16.3         18.4         16.9           0.1         13.4 
  Bonds of financial institutions           2.0           2.9           5.2           6.3         14.5 
  Shares of financial institutions           0.7           0.9           0.9           0.7           0.0 
Claims on the Corporate Sector         23.0         26.6         30.2         35.9         24.6 
  Equity         16.4         18.0         16.8         11.6           0.0 
  Bonds           2.6           5.2           9.7         21.5         24.6 
  Units of investment funds           4.1           3.5           3.6           2.7           0.0 
Claims on the Foreign Sector         53.1         39.8         25.5         23.9           0.3 
  Units of mutual funds and shares         50.5         38.3         24.5         22.7           0.0 
Others           2.6           1.6           1.0           1.2           0.4 
Total assets (US$ million)  16,846.0  20,367.2  40,281.4    9,632.9    1,410.0 
 
The Case of Mexico 
 
The reform of the Mexican pension system took place in 1996 and its operational 
framework has been evolving gradually towards the implementation of a multi-fund 
scheme. The 1997-economic crisis negatively impacted investment opportunities for 
pension funds. Therefore, given the country’s domestic macroeconomic conditions and 
the strict quantitative regulations on variable-income and foreign-issued instruments, it 





                                                 
46 See Appendix 7. 
  28In 2004, each PFA was allowed 
to offer two different funds. The old 
fund  (Siefore 1) was then allowed to 
invest up to 20 percent of its assets in 
foreign fixed-income instruments. The 
new fund (Siefore 2) was allowed to 
invest up to 15 percent of its assets in 
variable-income instruments, using 
diversified instruments linked to indexes 
and with capital protection.
47 Yet, as of 
December 2006, the asset allocation of 
the two funds did not differ significantly 
(Table 14). In 2007, the Mexican 
pension system was reformed. In order 
to improve the investment regime of 
PFAs, taking into account the lifecycle and risk-profile of affiliates, each Afore has the 
option of starting up to three new pension funds.
48 These funds are allowed to invest 
larger shares of their portfolios in variable-income instruments. As of August 2007, nine 
Afores were offering an additional third fund, which can invest up to 20 percent of its 
assets in variable-income instruments. Since 2002, the gradual relaxation of quantitative 
investment limits has been combined with a value at risk measure. 
Table 14: Mexico: Portfolio composition of pension 
funds, by fund and instrument, December 2006 
(percent) 
Instrument  Siefore 
  1  2 
Fixed-income   100.0 92.2 
   Public sector  76.3  73.6 
   Financial sector  6.4  4.9 
   Corporate sector
a  11.2  9.5 
   Foreign sector  6.1  4.2 
Variable-income  --  7.8 
   Domestic    2.0 
   Foreign     5.8 
Total assets (LCU million)   54,106    471,617   
Note: 




The Case of Peru 
 
The reform of the Peruvian pension system took place in 1992 and it has also 
been moving slowly towards a multi-fund regime, initially implemented in 2005. The 
portfolio of Peruvian pension funds has been more diversified in comparison to other 
reformed LAC countries, while being consistent with the objectives of a multi-fund 
scheme. The risk-return decreases from Fund 1 (Capital Preservation Fund) to Fund 2 
(Mixed Fund, the old fund) to Fund 3 (Capital Appreciation Fund). Data for 2006 show 
that the most conservative fund invests more than half of its assets in fixed-income 
instruments, while the assets of the most aggressive fund are mostly invested in equities 
(Table 15). But it is important to acknowledge that portfolio composition is related, to 
some degree, the country’s regulatory framework. In the multi-fund scheme, affiliates 
younger than 60 years-old can a fund according to their risk-return preferences.
49 
Whenever a worker joins the private pension system, his or her employer must name the 
administrator that will manage the worker’s contributions – as long as the worker, in a 





                                                 
47 Capital protection means that pension funds must be invested in zero coupon bonds with no restrictions 
on maturity together with variable-income instruments in a 1:1 rate. 
48 See Table A4 in Appendix 1. 
49 Workers older than 59 years-old are automatically assigned to Fund 1. 
  29Relative Minimum Rates of Return 
 
Minimum rates of return and high market concentration aggravate herding 
behavior in the pension industry.
50 In order to limit the risk faced by contributors of 
mandatory DC pension systems, some emerging economies have imposed regulations on 
minimum rates of return, relative to the industry average, on investments made by 
pension fund administrators. In LAC, five reformed countries impose relative minimum 
rates of return on investments of pension funds, namely Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador and Uruguay (Table 16).
51 Even though this feature of the regulatory 
framework aggravates the herding behavior in the pension fund industry, herding has also 
been observed in other pension systems, including the developed ones with thousands of 
funds and behaviorally-oriented investment regimes, such as the UK.
52 In these cases, 
herding behavior resumes because managers are pressured by boards of pension funds to 
show satisfactory performances, which usually involves comparisons with peers and/or 
industry benchmarks, and tend to opt for defensive strategies so as to avoid 
underperforming relative to the benchmark and losing their affiliates. Even though 
portfolios may be similar across different pension fund managers due to herding, the 
average portfolio can and does drift over time.
53 
 
Table 15: Peru: Portfolio composition of pension funds, by fund and instrument, December 2006 (percent) 
Instrument   Fund   
  1 2 3 
Claims on the Public Sector       29.4            19.0        8.0 
  Central Bank of Peru         1.8              1.3         0.9 
  Central Government       27.6            17.7         7.1 
Claims on the Financial Sector       20.6           18.3       15.2 
  Mortgage bonds         0.1            0.1         0.0 
  Time deposits         6.9            5.4         4.4 
  Bonds of financial institutions         8.7            2.0         0.4 
  Shares of financial institutions         0.6            9.3         9.3 
  Debt         4.3            1.5         1.1 
Claims on the Corporate Sector       43.9          53.4       72.1 
  Shares         9.2          33.2       64.5 
  Bonds       32.3          15.3         6.6 
  Units of investment funds         2.0            2.6         0.6 
  Others         0.4            2.4         0.4 
Claims on the Foreign Sector         4.8            9.0         4.1 
  Units of mutual funds and shares         3.8            6.6         3.1 
  Debt         0.9            2.1         0.5 
  Time deposits         0.1            0.2         0.5 
Others         5.9            7.0         4.3 
Total assets (LCU million)  2,693.6 41,044.8 2,311.8 
Source: SBS. 
 
                                                 
50 See, for example, Shah (1997), Vittas (1997, 1998), Queisser (1999), Srinivas and Yermo (1999), 
Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo (2000), and Olivares (2005).  
51 In Peru, the legal framework refers to a minimum rate guarantee that is to be defined by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. The regulation, however, has not yet been issued.  
52 The extreme herding behavior in the UK is well discussed in Blake et al (2000) and Myners (2002). 
53 Even within a small band, each fund manager has the freedom to slightly deviate from the average, and 
the direction towards which managers find preferable to deviate does matter (Valdés 1999). 
  30Table 16: Profitability rules by country, April 2007  
Country  Description of profitability regulations 
Argentina  Each administrator must guarantee that the average real rate of return in the last 12 months is 
equal to at least 70 percent the system’s average or this same profitability minus two 
percentage points (whichever is the lowest).  
Chile  Each administrator must guarantee that the average real rate of return in the last 36 months is 
not lower than the lesser of (a) the average real return of each fund minus 2 percentage 
points for funds C, D, and E and 4 percentage points for funds A and B, or (b) 50 percent of 
the average real return of all the funds.
 
Colombia
  Each administrator must guarantee that the average real rate of return in the last 36 months is 
equal to at least 70 percent the system’s average. 
El Salvador  Each pension fund administrator must guarantee that the average real rate of return in the 
last 12 months is equal to (a) at least the system’s average minus 3 percentage points, or (b) 
80 percent of the average real return of all the funds (whichever is the lowest). 
Uruguay  Each administrator must guarantee an annual average real rate of return, calculated every 
month, that is the lowest of 2 percent or the system’s average minus 2 percentage points.  
Sources: SAFJP, SAFP, Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, El Salvador’s Pension Supervisor and 
Banco Central del Uruguay. 
 
Overall, rates of return have been similar across different pension fund managers 
since the inception of the reformed pension systems. This similarity of returns across 
managers reflects the similar composition of their portfolios – the herding behavior that 
has been well documented in the literature.
54
 
In Colombia, modest increases in the 
dispersion of real rates of return across pension fund administrators are due to increases 
in portfolio diversification, especially with respect to foreign-issued instruments, but they 
remain relatively low indicating herding behavior in the industry (Figure 16). For 
Argentina and Peru, the averages and standard deviations of real rates of return have been 
more volatile than in the case of Colombia and the low coefficient of variation across 
administrators points to possible herding behavior (Figure 17 and Figure 18). 
 
IV.3.2. Under-Developed Capital Markets  
 
Portfolio allocation of pension funds in emerging markets is also related to 
relatively small, illiquid, and concentrated domestic capital markets. The growth of assets 
managed by pension funds, due to both reasonably high rates of return and mandatory 
contributions, has been higher than the development of domestic capital markets, 
especially in LAC (Figure 19). This resulted in a situation of “pension funds in search of 










                                                 
54 See, for example, Queisser (1999), and Srinivas et al. (2000). 
  31Figure 16: Colombia: Real 3-year rates of return of 
pension funds, average and standard deviation, 
March 2001-December 2006 (percent) 
Figure 17: Argentina: Real annual rates of return of 
pension funds, average and standard deviation, July 
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Source: Based on data from SAFJP. 
Figure 18: Peru: Real annual rates of return of 
pension funds, average and standard deviation, 
August 1994- December 2006 (percent) 
Figure 19: Selected LAC countries Pension fund 
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Source: Source Based on data from SBS.  Sources: AIOS and the World Bank Financial 
Development Database. 
 
Despite intense reform efforts in LAC during the 1990s, capital markets remain 
underdeveloped relative to both developed and other emerging economies. Given the 
region’s economic and institutional fundamentals, the development of stock markets is 
below what it was expected to be. De la Torre et al. (2006) found a shortfall in domestic 
stock market activity in the LAC region, even after controlling for variables, such as per 
capita income, macroeconomic policies, and the legal and institutional environments. On 
domestic bond markets, both developed and emerging economies have shown substantial 
growth since the early 1990s. In LAC, most of the expansion took place in public bond 







  32Table 17: Capital market development in Latin America, G-7, and East Asia, 1990 and 2004 (percent) 




b East  Asian 
countries
c 
  1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004 
Domestic stock market             
   Market capitalization/GDP       12.4       42.3  48.2  93.6       53.5    147.1 
   Value traded domestically/GDP         2.0         6.1  23.9  92.2       82.7    104.5 
   Capital raised domestically/GDP         0.4         0.5  0.9  1.4         3.4        5.9 
Domestic bond market             
   Amount outstanding of domestic 
public sector bonds/GDP       12.3       20.7  50.5  67.9       13.9       25.6 
   Amount outstanding of domestic 
private sector bonds/GDP         4.4       10.7  38.6  47.7       15.9       36.3 
Notes: 
aAverages for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
bAverages for 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and US. 
cAverages for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, S&P Emerging Markets Database, World Bank and World 
Federation of Exchanges in de la Torre et al. (2006). 
 
Pension funds already have a substantial participation in the markets for some 
instruments (Figure 20). In 2005, their holdings of public sector bonds was around half of 
the total in Chile and Peru and about one-third of the total in Argentina, Colombia, and 
Mexico. For the other three instruments shown in Figure 20 – except for time deposits in 
Chile with pension funds holding more than one-third of the total in 2005 – the 
participation of pension funds is not as concentrated, which might be partially due to 
local regulatory frameworks, but it has been showing an overall increasing trend.  
 
The under-representation of pension funds in equity markets is to some extent due 
to local capital market limitations. Domestic equity markets in LAC are generally 
illiquid, particularly in the case of small and medium caps, reducing the attractiveness of 
this asset class. Although PFAs are not active traders in equity markets, illiquid shares 
prove to be challenging since they make market exit difficult while creating valuation 
problems, which may negatively affect rates of return. This could be worsened with the 
inclusion of additional small cap shares, which would impose higher research and 
monitoring costs without significantly improving the portfolio’s risk-return profile (IMF 
and World Bank 2004). In Chile, as of December 2006, pension funds were allowed to 
invest in 91 listed stocks approved by the Risk Rating Commission, but they were 
actually invested in 70 stocks and total investments were below the quantitative ceiling 
for this asset class. Yet, given their importance as institutional investors, the lack of 
interest of pension funds for such instruments may, in turn, discourage their issuances.
55 
 
The view that pension funds have contributed to the development of the domestic 
capital market prevails. Several analyses of the interactions between the growth of 
pension funds and capital market development highlight the influence of PFAs in: (a) the 
development of better regulations, (b) their fundamental role in the creation of important 
institutions (e.g., central custodian and electronic stock exchange), (c) their role in the 
development of specific instruments (e.g., mortgage bonds and corporate bonds), and (d) 
                                                 
55 See also Catalán (2003). 
  33their positive influence in the quality of corporate governance (IMF and World Bank 
2004). Walker and Lefort (2002), for example, show that the pension reform significantly 
contributed to improvements in the financial regulatory and legal framework as well as in 
transparency and corporate governance in Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
56 
 
Figure 20: Selected LAC countries: Pension fund participation in the domestic capital markets per 
instrument, 2000-2005 (percent) 























































Note: Participation of Mexican pension funds in the domestic equity market was zero percent in 2000-
2004 and 0.1 percent in 2005. 
Sources: Based on data from AIOS and the World Bank Financial Development Database. 
 
However, the contribution of pension funds to capital market development should 
not be exaggerated. For example, the contribution of pension funds to market liquidity in 
Chile has been overestimated by many analysts, particularly earlier analyses that 
preceded the decline in turnover ratios for both stocks and fixed income instruments in 
the mid-1990s. Pension funds are not very active traders, either in stocks or bonds. 
Moreover, the increasing concentration of the Chilean industry in the 1990s probably 
further aggravated the liquidity problem. Neither have pension funds contributed to the 
creation of a credit curve due to the concentration of their investments in equity and 
bonds in highly rated issuances, and their contribution to the development of a private 
equity market has also been limited (IMF and World Bank 2004). In addition, a recent 
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See Holzman (1996), Acuña and Iglesias (2001), Impavido et al. (2003), Cifuentes et al. (2002), Agosin 
and Pasten (2003), and Roldos (2004). 
  34study further analyzed the contribution of pension funds to capital market development in 
Chile, finding that the growth of pension fund assets has impacted the size and the 
structure of the domestic financial market. However, the investment strategy of 
administrators had little effect on the market efficiency (Yermo 2005).  
 
IV.3.3. Macroeconomic Environment 
 
At the time of the pension reforms, some LAC countries presented unstable 
macroeconomic environments (Figure 21 and Figure 22) or were emerging from an 
economic crisis that resulted from unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies coupled 
with weak financial systems (Singh and Cerisola 2006).
57 It was only in the mid-1990s 
that most countries managed to control inflation and to decrease average public debt 
levels.
58 The current account imbalances have improved with the fiscal discipline 
undertaken by governments in the region. Real GDP per capita growth in LAC has been 
very volatile and more than 70 percent of this volatility was due to country-specific 
shocks (IMF 2005). 
 
 
Figure 21: Selected LAC countries: Annual inflation, boxplot (percent) 






























































Argentina  Bolivia  Chile Colombia C. Rica El Salv. Mexico  Peru  Uruguay
Notes: Values above 500 percent were not included in (a), which occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. 
Boxplot is a graph of the five-number, in which the central box spans the 25
th and the 75
th percentiles, the 
line in the box marks the median, lines extend from the box out to the minimum and the maximum 
observations and “dots” represent outliers. 
Source: WDI. 
The uncertain macroeconomic landscape did not favor the asset allocation of 
pension funds.
59 In these circumstances, it was common to restrict investments of pension 
funds in variable-income and foreign-issued instruments, thus favoring their asset 
allocation in government debt – some governments also applied such restrictions to help 
manage the fiscal costs of the transition from a PAYG to a funded system instead of 
relying on increased public savings. 
 
                                                 
57 See Zettelmeyer (2006) and Jaeger (2007). 
58 Since the early 2000s, public deficits and indebtedness have been trending downwards. Active debt 
management and reforms are helping LAC countries to develop capital markets (Singh and Cerisola, 2006). 
See also Carstens and Jácome (2005). 
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Figure 22: Selected LAC countries: Current account deficit as a share of GDP, boxplot (percent) 
















































































Argentina  Bolivia  Chile Colombia C. Rica El Salv. Mexico  Peru  Uruguay
Note: Boxplot is a graph of the five-number, in which the central box spans the 25
th and the 75
th percentiles, 
the line in the box marks the median, lines extend from the box out to the minimum and the maximum 
observations and “dots” represent outliers. 
Source: WDI. 
Macroeconomic improvements coupled with relaxation of the investment regime 
and measures to develop securities markets will contribute to the improved asset 
allocation of pension funds in the future. Greater foreign diversification will be necessary 
to compensate for the developing nature of local capital markets.  
 
V.  The Approach to Pension Supervision 
 
Consistent with the restrictive investment regulation approach discussed above, 
most supervisor authorities of mandatory DC pension systems in the LAC region were 
designed as proactive agencies expected to closely monitor the performance of pension 
funds and pension fund managers. A similar approach was adopted in some Eastern 
European countries. Specialized pension supervisors were generally set up to safeguard 
the stability and resilience of the new pension systems. Over time, some countries, 
including El Salvador, Hungary, and Peru, moved towards a more integrated supervisory 
approach of financial services, consolidating the supervision of all financial entities under 
a single agency.
60 Consolidation can facilitate the supervision of financial conglomerates 
and ensure better use of scarce supervisory resources, especially in small countries.
61 By 
contrast, most OECD countries follow a reactive approach towards pension supervision, 
although a new paradigm has emerged. For instance, Australia, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands moved towards a risk-based supervision model. 
 
The monitoring activity by pension supervisors in LAC has generally been 
intense. But the effective surveillance capability of supervisors has remarkably varied 
across the region, with some agencies requesting more information than they can 
effectively analyze (Acuña 2005). Enforcement tools, such as power to issue warnings, 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 See Appendix 8. 
60Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Mexico have specialized pension supervisors. 
61 See Taylor and Fleming (1999) and Abrams and Taylor (2000) for discussions on lessons from 
integrating financial supervision and issues related to the unification process.  
  36impose sanctions, and cancel operating licenses, have generally been available to 
safeguard the system’s stability and protect workers’ retirement savings. Many agencies 
have actively used sanction powers to prevent and correct for non-compliance but, in 
some cases, such powers were not well-defined in the law. Enforcement of the 
supervisor’s decisions in small countries with weak governance and institutional 
environments has been a challenging task. In El Salvador, for instance, the supervisor 
(Superintendencia de Pensiones, El Salvador C.A.) generally found it difficult to impose 
sanctions on non-compliant PFAs, especially in the system’s early years of operation, 
which were made even more complicated due to legal and institutional deficiencies 
(Acuña 2005). 
 
Although the pension surveillance approach has been successful in avoiding fraud 
and major irregularities, it has focused on compliance without considering the costs 
imposed by the regulatory framework on pension fund performance. Berstein and 
Chumacero (2006a) estimated the average costs of quantitative investment restrictions in 
Chile for the period 1987-2002 to be around 10 percent of the system’s 2002-account 
balances. However, a relaxation of quantitative restrictions needs to be accompanied by 
an alternative risk-based supervisory method to avoid principal-agent problems. In 
addition, the traditional compliance-based supervisory approach cannot properly address 
all potential operational risks that can arise due to the lack of adequate internal control. 
Recognizing these gaps, Mexico has started to implement a risk-based supervisory 
framework and Chile is reconsidering its surveillance approach and designing a transition 
framework towards risk-based supervision. 
 
Among the countries that have introduced risk management tools based on value-
at-risk (VaR) principles, Mexico is a prominent example. It took the first steps toward a 
risk-based supervision framework in 2002, when quantitative provisions of the 
investment regime were partially relaxed and a VaR limit was introduced together with 
guidelines for managing it (Berstein and Chumacero 2006b). Portfolio composition and 
asset value are reported daily at market value, allowing for close estimation of probability 
distributions for returns. Risk exposure is also managed with investment rules that restrict 
asset categories, counterpart exposure limits, and benchmarking of liquidity indicators. 
This approach replaced an older system that measured risk using average weighted 
maturity calculations. As VaR tools are introduced, the weight of quantitative restrictions 
in the risk-management-tools portfolio has been decreasing. In 2005, the first version of a 
more comprehensive risk-based supervision framework was implemented in the country, 
based on a scoring system assessing: (a) operations, (b) internal control, and (c) financial 
performance. Several upgrades and revisions have taken place since 2005, such as the 
development of an early warning system and new regulations on operational risks and the 
role of compliance officers.
62 
 
It is early to evaluate the results of the new risk-based framework applied in 
Mexico, but several lessons can be drawn by other LAC countries. The shift towards a 
risk-based supervision framework entails a learning curve for both the supervisor and the 
fund managers, requiring the establishment of a transition period with selective and 
                                                 
62 See Berstein and Chumacero (2006b) for more details. 
  37gradual relaxation of quantitative regulations. Cognizant of this learning process, Consar 
has kept its traditional compliance approach, while testing the new supervisory model. 
Therefore, it may be the case for relaxing quantitative investment limits, but not to fully 
replace them with a pure risk-based measure. 
 
Based on the experiences of Mexico and other countries, the risk-based 
supervisory framework is likely to demand substantial adjustments in the areas of 
corporate governance, internal procedures for risk management, and transparency. It will 
be necessary for the regulatory framework to clearly define the fiduciary and 
accountability duties of directors and senior managers to ensure that they act in the best 
interest of affiliates as well as to set minimum standards for the development of sound 
risk management plans. While in some countries, such as Chile, managers have started to 
adopt risk management tools, progress has been uneven (IMF and World Bank 2004). In 
addition, internal audit departments will need to be strengthened, and regulations defining 
common standards on internal auditing will have to be issued. In parallel, a scoring model 
will need to be defined to systematically rate the risk of pension funds. 
 
In defining new regulations and scoring models, LAC countries will be able to 
draw upon lessons from the risk-based approach already applied to banking supervision 
(Basel 2) and from the limited (and recent) OECD experiences with risk-based pension 
supervision, in particular from Australia where DC pension plans are starting to prevail.
63 
The aforementioned changes will also demand new skills mixes in most agencies, 
emphasizing investment and operational risk analysis. Many LAC countries, especially 
Chile with a more mature pension system and possibly Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and 
Uruguay, should be ready to initiate a gradual move from a compliance-based towards a 
risk-based supervision framework. However, the pace of change should take into account 




Following the lead of Chile, several emerging economies embarked on social 
security reforms in the 1990s, replacing their PAYG systems with funded DC schemes. 
As was well put by Roldos (2007), “pension reform is an ongoing process and there are a 
number of areas in which countries could focus so as to achieve its primary objectives of 
improving consumption smoothing and alleviating old-age poverty.” Overall, the 
outcomes of the reforms contributed to decreasing the fiscal imbalances of the old 
systems with positive effects on macroeconomic performance as well as improvements in 
the rate of return on investments made by pension fund administrators. The long-term 
fiscal savings could have been even higher and the transition smoother, if more countries 
had relied on increased public savings, rather than increased borrowing, to finance the 
transition. However, looking forward, the reformed pension systems have a number of 
challenges to overcome, particularly if the growth of asset bases continues at current 
levels. A key matter to be carefully considered is how to well diversify the portfolio of 
pension funds. In addition, fees charged by administrators are binding and there is ample 
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  38room for further decline and, if these reductions are passed to affiliates, to reduce social 
welfare losses. 
 
The pension industry has been highly concentrated with a trend towards 
decreasing the number of fund managers, mostly through mergers and acquisitions, in 
order to take advantage of economies of scale. In most LAC countries, management fees 
remain relatively high and declines in operational costs have not been fully passed 
through to consumers, reinforcing the presence of market deficiencies. A new body of 
literature has emerged trying to explain the factors that impede the development of more 
competitive pension markets in LAC countries. The two main factors are barriers to entry 
and the low demand elasticity of affiliates, which is further aggravated due to the 
prevalence of inadequately financially literate consumers, a problem also found in OECD 
countries. While minimum entry requirements, such as capital, experience and integrity, 
to the industry responsible for managing mandatory old-age savings are necessary, other 
restrictions such as controls on transfers have created artificial market barriers by making 
it more difficult for new entrants to capture a number of affiliates that is large enough so 
that they can attain an optimal operating size. 
 
Policymakers, aware of such problems, have developed a number of reforms to 
promote competition in DC pension markets. Some countries, such as Bolivia, have tried 
to address these issues by stipulating price ceilings that have largely become price floors. 
Mexico tried to lower barriers to entry in the industry as well as to address the concern on 
inelasticity of demand to fees. In 2002, it implemented new legislation that required the 
regulator to automatically assign new affiliates who did not choose a PFA to the 
administrator with the lowest fees. Transfer rules were subsequently made more flexible. 
The combination of these two measures brought about a reduction in the average 
management fee. More recently, Mexico has changed the indicator for automatic 
affiliation to the highest “net rate of returns” for the last 12 months and tightened transfer 
rules. It is too early to assess the impact of this amendment but this measure could face 
new challenges since past performance is not a predictor of future performance.  
 
Chile has attempted to address both demand and supply concerns and focused 
more on the root causes of inadequate competition (inelasticity of demand to fees and 
decreasing market barriers to new entrants). In January 2008, Congress approved a 
reform of the country’s pension system, which encompasses an integrated solidarity 
pillar; a strengthened contributory pillar, based on improved incentives to expand 
coverage of both the mandatory and voluntary pillars, increased competition, and 
enhanced diversification of the investment portfolio. To enhance price competition, it 
will organize a bidding mechanism for new affiliates, assigning them for a 24-month 
period to the PFA charging the lowest commission. Existing affiliates of the winning 
PFA will be charged the lowest commission at the time of the bidding. The reform will 
also facilitate unbundling of services to allow for a better use of economies of scale, 
especially on administrative services, and education of affiliates will be further promoted. 
It is important that the same investment regime applies to the pension fund administrators 
receiving the automatically assigned affiliates and other pension fund administrators in 
  39  40
the market so that this system creates a basis for comparison of PFAs and generates 
incentives for the former to keep good investment practices.  
 
In several emerging economies, the reformed pension systems became the core of 
their social security systems, making contributors more exposed to capital market 
volatility. This fact, along with the lack of experience of fund managers and the absence 
of adequate risk assessment tools and underdeveloped domestic capital markets, justified 
the adoption of quantitative regulatory frameworks. As a result, the portfolios of pension 
funds are not well diversified, but overly concentrated. Countries that had not built fiscal 
space prior to the implementing the pension reform or that went through severe economic 
crises have used pension funds as captive sources of financing to the public debt. Thus, it 
is not uncommon to have pension funds overly allocated in government securities. 
 
In the presence of a more sound and stable macroeconomic environment, some 
countries have started to realize the high costs imposed by the strict quantitative 
regulations on the asset allocation of pension funds as well as in terms of achieved real 
rates of return. As a result, a gradual relaxation of investment limits has been taking 
place, favoring investments in equities and foreign-issued instruments, combined with 
some form of behaviorally-oriented approach. Such relaxation should continue on a 
gradual manner in coordination with sovereign debt management and evolvements in 
regulations governing capital markets. As the regulatory framework evolves, so does 
supervision. In this case, it is appropriate to develop an alternative risk-based supervisory 
method. Overall, pension reforms have had a modest and positive effect in the 
development of local capital markets; but this has been limited to public debt markets in 
most countries. Chile is one of the few countries where the effects have been broader and 
the growth of pension fund assets has impacted the size and structure of the domestic 
financial market; but the investment strategy of administrators had little effect on market 
efficiency. 
 
In sum, although several challenges remain, the overall progress achieved in 
countries that implemented pension reforms has been positive. Policymakers should 
continue revising the legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks, with a focus on the 
investment management of pension funds and the fee structure of administrators. This 
would allow the systems to evolve along with sustained growth of pension funds, and, 
ultimately, to improve consumption smoothing and alleviate old-age poverty. Finally, the 
lessons learned from pension reforms in the LAC region are relevant for other emerging 
economies trying to embark in similar reforms. 
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  48Appendix 1. Tables 
 
Table A1: Total accumulated explicit pension debt since 2001 (percent) 
Source: Zviniene and Packard (2002). 
Instrument 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Argentina           
   Reform  25  58    96  140  189 
   No reform  10  35    72  119  172 
Bolivia       
   Reform  16  32    44    50    53 
   No reform  29  84  164  269  392 
Chile           
   Reform  22  47    61    68    74 
   No reform  19  51    92  134  177 
Colombia       
   Reform  13  44    91  152  224 
   No reform  30  82  151  235  330 
El Salvador           
   Reform  11  28    53    74    87 
   No reform  21  52    94  144  202 
Mexico       
   Reform    9  19    27    35    42 
   No reform    8  23    43    68    96 
Peru             
   Reform    6  14    24    33    43 
   No reform    6  19    40    69  104 
Uruguay          
   Reform  18  42    69    98  128 
   No reform  34  83  142  213  290 
 
Table A2: Number of sales agents across PFAs in selected LAC countries, 2000-2005 
Country  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Argentina  11,683  11,381    9,118    9,227    9,120    8,161 
Bolivia          0          0          0        70        66       67 
Chile    4,382    3,868    3,944    3,812    2,281    2,348 
Colombia    4,933    3,853    3,341    2,941    2,554    2,622 
Costa Rica  n.a.    1,463  n.a.  n.a.  n.d  n.d 
El Salvador      856      573      413      399      376  n.d 
Mexico  13,482  10,781  12,116  17,870  22,121  36,734 
Peru    1,042      880      861      894    1,115    3,168 
Uruguay      342      197      193      123      129      123 
Total  36,720 32,996 29,986 35,336 37,762 53,223 









  49Table A3: Number of transfers across PFAs, 2000-2006 
Country       2000       2001       2002       2003       2004       2005       2006 
Argentina  401,009  412,683  330,542   364,384   710,590    243,326   431,543 
Bolivia  0  0    2,930   3,447    4,013   4,174  
Chile  255,626  235,245  228,856   274,751   211,472    234,593   234,536  
Colombia  n.a.  n.a.  169,551   122,949   79,617    72,724   66,488  
Costa Rica  --  5,978    74,842   73,661    97,270   98,846  
El Salvador  134,957  77,798  40,636   53,361   36,700    67,652   10,118  
Mexico  99,300  116,600  133,345   430,617   1,204,776    2,437,961   3,849,333  
Peru  7,329  4,667  8,768   9,037   9,845    129,398   642,966  
Dominican Rep.  --  --  --  --  1,348    733   861  
Uruguay  n.a.  330  1,251   529   322    560   562  
Total  898,221  853,301  912,949   1,333,400   2,331,778    3,288,230   5,339,427  
Note: n.a. means not available. 
Source: AIOS. 
 
Table A4:Mexico: Investment Limits per Instrument (August 2007) 
    Limits by kind of SIEFORE (fund)
1 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Value at Risk  
[VARhistorical(1-α=95%, 1 day)] 
0.6%  1.0%  1.3%  1.6%  2.0% 
Equity  0%  15%  20%  25%  30%  Market 
risk  Foreign Currency (Dollars, Euros, Yens or  
currencies to acquire equity) 
30%  30%  30%  30%  30% 
  Derivatives  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
mxAAA2 and government securities  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
mxAA-rated securities  35%  35%  35%  35%  35%  Credit risk 
mxA-rated  securities  5%  5% 5% 5%  5% 
mxAAA rated securities from one issuer or 
counterpart 
5%  5%  5%  5%  5% 
mxAA rated securities from one issuer or 
counterpart 
3%  3%  3%  3%  3% 
mxA rated securities from one issuer or 
counterpart 
1%  1%  1%  1%  1% 
BBB+ rated security denominated in foreign 
currency from one issuer 










BBB-rated security denominated in foreign 
currency from one issuer 
3%  3%  3%  3%  3% 
A-rated foreign securities from one issuer or 
counterpart 









































Maximum ownership of one issue 
 
20% 20%  20%  20%  20% 
Foreign securities (if fixed income, minimum 
rate is A-) 
20%  20%  20%  20%  20% 
Securitizations  10%  15%  20%  30%  40% 




2  0%  5%  5%  10%  10% 
  Inflation-protected securities minimum  51% min.  No  No  No  No 
Securities endorsed by related parties  15%  15%  15%  15%  15%  Conflict of 
interests  Securities endorsed by parties related to the 
Afore 
5%  5% 5% 5%  5% 
Note: 
1As percentage of assets under management. The table shows ceilings except for the inflation 
protection securities, which are floors. 
2Real estate must be in Mexican territory. 
Source: CONSAR. 
  50Appendix 2. A Comprehensive Reform of the Chile Pension System
64 
 
In January 2008, the Chilean Congress approved a reform of the country’s 
pension system, which is based on three pillars: (a) an integrated solidarity pillar, (b) a 
strengthened contributory pillar, based on improved coverage, competition, and 
investment returns on contributions, and (c) an expanded voluntary contributory pillar. 
 
The reform establishes a new solidarity pillar with old-age, disability, and 
survivorship benefits integrated to the benefits provided by the contributory pillar, 
financed with fiscal resources from the Solidarity Fund. This would gradually replace the 
current programs of minimum pension guarantee and state pension with a universal basic 
pension for workers who do not receive pensions from the contributory system. The years 
of contribution requirement would be eliminated for purposes of determining benefits and 
replaced with the value of the pension self-funded by the worker’s savings. The pension 
amount would be progressively decreased with respect to the pension provided by the 
contributory pillar, until completely disappearing – when the self-funded pension reaches 
255,000 Pesos per month. (Lower ceilings will apply prior to 2012.) In addition, access to 
benefits provided under this pillar would be granted to workers of both genders who 
comply with the residency and economic requirements. Overall, this pillar would benefit 
workers that have lapses in contributions, including the seasonal workforce and the self-
employed. Workers that belong to the richest 40 percent of households would be 
excluded from this pillar. 
 
On price and competition in the contributory pillar, the reformed system will 
organize a bidding mechanism for new affiliates joining the individual capitalization 
system, assigning them, for a 24-month period, to the Pension Fund Administrator 
(Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones, PFA) charging the lowest commission. To win 
the auction, the PFA will also have to charge old affiliates during the same 24-month 
period a price below the lowest price prevailing in the system at the time the bidding was 
submitted. The fixed fee charged by PFAs would be deducted from workers’ wages 
instead of their individual capitalization accounts and PFAs would be allowed to give 
discounts on commissions charged based on the effective enrollment period with the 
same administrator. The reformed system encourages subcontracting of administrative 
services. 
 
To increase the return and security of investments, the three main modifications 
are: (a) relaxing the structure of the investment regime, (b) relaxing quantitative 
investment limits for both domestic and foreign investments, and (c) promoting 
competition based on the quality of the management of pension funds’ assets, with the 





                                                 
64 Based on Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma Previsional (2006). 
 
  51Appendix 3. Mexico: Fostering Greater Competition
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Since 2001, a series of legal and regulatory changes have been adopted to foster 
competition and lower fees in the Mexican pension industry. They have induced a 
dramatic fall in fees and costs as well as significantly narrowed fee dispersion. The main 
changes implemented are: 
 
(a) Automatic assignation of affiliates’ accounts without an administrator: Until 
2001, the accounts of affiliates who did not choose a pension fund administrator (Afore) 
were managed by the Central Bank. Between 2001 and 2002, about 7 million accounts 
were automatically assigned by the Mexican Commission for the Retirement System 
(Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro, Consar). In 2001, four criteria 
were used: equivalent fee for a 25-year projection; historical yields on returns; 
identification number; and financial sustainability of the Afore. In early 2002, the criteria 
were modified to give greater weight to the equivalent fee estimated on a 5-year basis, 
and, in March 2002, it was decided that the equivalent fee commission calculated on a 
25- year basis would be the criterion for automatically assigning affiliates without an 
Afore. In 2005, the equivalent fee estimated on a 1-year projection basis became the new 
criterion used by Consar to automatically assign close to 80 percent of new system’s 
affiliates to an Afore. 
 
(b) Transfers: Initial regulations limited transfers across Afores to once a year, 
obliged the affiliate to provide extensive documentation, and required administrator 
holding the account to initiate the process. In 2004, an amendment to the law allowed 
affiliates to switch more than once a year if they transferred to an Afore with lower fees. 
 
(c) Information disclosure: Having realized the complexity of the fee structure, 
Consar has made significant efforts to improve information to affiliates inter alia 
upgraded regulations concerning marketing, and developed standard indicators for 
comparing performance across Afores. Consar also provides extensive information 
through its website and call center. 
 
(d)  Procesar: In 2004, legal changes were adopted to reduce and modify the 
charging structure of Procesar, the central operator of the pension system’s database, 
which is in charge of reconciling information on contributions with actual financial flows 
and to redistribute them to Afores. In 2005, Consar adopted various measures to reduce 
the system’s costs and enhance its operational efficiency. To enhance Procesar’s 
governance structure, the number of independent board members increased from 1 to 4 
and the board’s chairman was required to be an independent member. Procesar costs 
about 5 percent of system’s operational costs while record keeping in each administrator 
is estimated at 30 percent of each Afore’s costs. There is scope for exploiting further 
economies of scale. 
 
In the first half of 2007, the Congress modified the pension law. The most 
important amendments were: (a) simplification of the fee structure to an asset-based 
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  52structure, (b) limiting the number of transfers across Afores  to one per affiliate per 
annum, (c) allowing the transfer of affiliates before the 12-month period when they 
switch to an Afore with a higher net profitability indicator, in which they must remain for 
12 months, and (d) automatically assigning affiliates who do not choose an Afore to the 
administrator with the highest net returns. The new fee structure will facilitate 
comparisons across Afores  to the average affiliate, while the definition of critical 
parameters to determine net rate of returns (e.g., period of measurement) and the criteria 
for Afores to pay salesmen will be set by Consar’s regulations. In addition, in order to 
promote portfolio diversification and higher rates of return, the investment regime was 
changed. Each Afore will have the option to offer three additional funds (Siefores) with 
investment strategies varying according to contributors’ age and risk preferences. These 
Siefores should invest a larger share of their funds in variable-income instruments. 
 
Appendix 4. Lessons from the Swedish New Financial Defined Contribution Scheme
 66 
 
In the 1990s, Sweden transformed its DB PAYG scheme into a combination of a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) PAYG and a financial defined contribution (FDC) 
scheme with a DB guarantee benefit level. The contribution rate for the NDC and FDC 
schemes is 16 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. In the NDC, accounts are notional 
and the rate of return is based on the average covered wage.
a In the FDC, affiliates have 
individual accounts and choose up to 5 funds to invest their contributions from a large 
number of funds. While contributions to the FDC have been made since 1995, individual 
fund choices became available in 2000. 
 
Given the small size of the FDC pillar, authorities paid careful attention to its 
design and developed a structure in which funds could be efficiently managed at a low 
cost. They separated administrative and investment management functions, where the 
former is centralized and publicly managed and the latter is open to private competition. 
The Premium Pension Authority (PPM) was set up to administer the FDC pillar, 
including the maintenance of individual accounts, collection and information on 
participating funds, transfers, and the provision of information services to workers. It 
relies on the Swedish tax administration authority to collect contributions, allowing for 
additional administrative savings. The sole responsibility of fund managers is to invest 
the funds during the accumulation phase, and they have no direct interaction with 
workers. Also, the PPM will become the monopoly annuity provider during the 
decumulation phase. 
 
The authorities tried to reduce entry barriers and to create a competitive fund 
management market. All fund managers registered with the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority are allowed to participate in the system. By December 2005, over 
700 funds were registered in the system and around 50 percent of assets were invested in 
equity funds and 30 percent in the default option. Excluding the default option, there is 
limited concentration among private pension funds and, as of 2004, the 20 largest private 
funds held about 33 percent of the assets. 
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  53Total charges were moderate in the initial years of operation and are expected to 
decline as the asset base expands – the total charge (the PPM administration fee and the 
manager’s fees) was 60 basis points of in 2005 and is projected to decline to less than 30 
basis points in 2025.
b The PPM projects that its charge will fall to 10 and 4 basis points 
by 2015 and 2020, respectively. Initial costs were higher due to the small asset base and 
the fixed costs related to the development of information technology systems. The 
average fee for all funds (net of rebates) was 41 basis points in 2003 and it is projected to 
fall to about 24 basis points percent by 2020. The PPM designed a fee schedule for 
participating funds that is inversely related to the amount of assets held by fund 
managers, who can charge the fees they normally charge on similar products but pay a 
rebate, credited to the affiliates’ accounts, to the PPM if the fees exceed the PPM 
benchmarks. Marketing expenditures by fund managers are modest. 
 
The system, however, still faces challenges and criticisms. The FDC scheme was 
designed with free entry for fund managers with a price ceiling and, as a result, the 
number of funds is large. There are no restrictions on fund choices and affiliates could 
place all their mandatory old-age savings in high-risk and poorly diversified portfolios. 
Critics thus have called for limitations regarding fund choices and lowering the 
permissible risk exposure. The large number of alternatives has created a passive attitude 
among affiliates instead of promoting choice because individuals have difficulty 
comparing investments to risk tolerance. This has resulted in: (a) the lack of 
diversification of investments (there is a risk for home bias in the country one lives in or 
sector one works in), and (b) a risk that investment strategies do not change over time, 
therefore not adapting to individuals changing risk preference during their lifecycles. 
 
Appendix 5. The Importance of Financial Literacy for Retirement
 67 
 
In the conventional life-cycle microeconomic model, workers will rely on 
accurate knowledge regarding their likely retirement benefits and consumption needs in 
order to arrive at the optimal saving decisions (Skog 2006). If they lack key financial 
information, this can cause individuals to prepare inadequately for retirement (Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2006). Little is known about individuals’ reasons for acquiring financial 
knowledge. Older people may know more simply because they are closer to retirement, 
healthier people may know more because they expect to live longer in retirement, and 
wealthier or more educated individuals may know that they will need to rely more on 
their pensions in retirement than the poor. 
 
Analyses using US data found that the financial misinformation or lack of 
information is the norm (Gustman and Steinmeier 2001b). However, it was found some 
variability across the population: men tend to know more about their retirement benefits 
than women; the older the individual the more financially literate he or she is; and 
wealthier, healthier, and better educated individuals tend to be more informed about their 
retirement prospects (Mitchell 1988, Gustman and Steinmeier 2001a, and Chan and 
Stevens 2004). Individuals that are the most likely to rely on social security are the least 
informed, while those who are mostly expected to rely on their pensions are the most 
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  54well-informed (Luchak and Gunderson 2000). As a means of improving financial literacy 
in the US, several education programs were promoted. Caskey (2006) however argues 
that personal financial management education cannot be considered an effective 
mechanism for helping lower-income households accumulate financial assets and 
improve credit histories – in spite of the best existing studies of its effectiveness 
suggesting that it might help lower-income households build savings and improve credit 
records, their results are only suggestive. 
 
Some surveys on financial literacy were implemented in a few OECD countries. 
Although they differed in target audience, approach to measuring financial literacy, and 
methodology, one common result was the low level of financial understanding among 
respondents. The surveys that included questions about respondents’ social characteristics 
found that financial understanding is correlated with education and income levels. In 
Australia, the lowest levels of financial literacy are associated with low levels of 
education (year 10 or less), unemployment or low skilled work, low incomes, low levels 
of savings, being single, and being at either end of the age profile (18 to 24 year olds and 
those aged 70 years or older). In the UK, individuals in the lower social grades and the 
lowest income band, as well as young people aged 18 to 24, are likely to be the least 
receptive consumers. By contrast, the higher social grades, those with higher income, 
young couples and older respondents with no family are more likely to be sophisticated 
financial consumers, knowing how to get the information they need and understanding 
the advice they receive. In Korea, scores broken down by demographic characteristics 
indicated that students from families with less educated parents and/or students who have 
low income and professional expectations score the lowest (OECD 2005). 
 
Relatively few analysts have examined the question of pension knowledge outside 
of the US. Arenas de Mesa et al. (2006) used Chilean data from the 2004-Social 
Protection Survey (or Encuesta de Previsión Social, EPS) to examine trends of financial 
literacy variables across social groups. In addition, Skog (2006) used the same dataset to 
develop a multivariate analysis on the determinants of individuals’ financial literacy 
regarding several structural questions about their pension system. He aggregated these 
questions into clusters, representing aspects of the pension lifecycle, and literacy along 
these vectors of knowledge is assessed using an integer scoring system. Results showed 
that the older, healthier, more educated, married male workers know more about the 
system. Union members, those with higher incomes, and employees of larger companies 
are also more financially informed. Finally, he found that knowledge varies by subject 
area; accordingly, it is important to ascertain what literacy shortfalls must be targeted 
before determining what education efforts might be useful. 
 
Appendix 6. Insights on the “Prudent Person Rule
”68 
 
The “prudent person rule” is commonly applied by Anglo-Saxon countries and 
has its roots in the trust law. It is generally stated in terms of the following broad 
principle.“ A fiduciary must discharge his or her duties with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence that a prudent person acting in a like capacity would use in the conduct of an 
                                                 
68 Based on Galer (2002). 
  55enterprise of like character and aims.” It not only applies to investment management of 
pension assets, but also to the management of a trust, a pension plan, or a fund. Overall, 
this regulatory framework for the investment of pension funds is regarded as a complex 
and substantive rule of law that is composed of several basic duties and principles, which 
include: 
 
(a) A duty to act prudently and with due diligence: it focuses on how diligently a 
trustee or fiduciary performs his or her obligations with respect to the pension plan, 
including how investment decisions are made. Therefore, “The focus of the inquiry is 
how the fiduciary acted in his [or her] selection of the investment, and not whether his [or 
her] investments succeeded or failed. 
 
(b) A duty of loyalty to the pension fund and its members: the trustee must 
manage the trust, pension plan, or fund solely on the (best) interest of its members. 
 
(c) A duty to monitor: fiduciaries remain responsible for monitoring the activities 
they delegate, taking into account investment policies and review processes to assure that 
they have been prudently carried out. 
 
(d) A principle of diversification: given that fiduciaries should prudently manage 
assets and avoid undue risk, this principle requires the investment portfolio of pension 
funds to be suitably diversified and unwarranted risk to be avoided. 
 
Appendix 7. Herding Behavior in the Chilean Pension Fund Industry 
 
Herding behavior is commonly defined as the decisive intention of managers to 
copy investment decisions made by their competitors regardless of their own information 
(Devenon and Welch 1996, and Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). The mechanism for PFAs to 
achieve similar profitability rates is to mimic their asset allocations, which intensifies the 
herding behavior in the industry. Table I shows the mean and the standard deviation of 
portfolio weightings for different assets in Chile in 2000-2006. 
 
There is a prevalent view that the herding behavior of Chilean PFAs is due to the 
concentrated market structure and the existence of a minimum return guarantee, relative 
to the system’s average (IMF and World Bank 2004). The lack of an absolute benchmark 
thus encourages funds to copy each other’s strategy for asset allocation. The herding 
behavior of Chilean pension fund administrators was analyzed by Olivares (2005), who 
used monthly data on asset allocation by fund and administrator for the period June 1997 
to December 2001. He found that managers herd on asset allocation and stock trading. 
For asset allocation, a 99 percent correlation between the variability of returns of 
individual managers and the industry average (benchmark) was found. For stocks, results 
showed a high positive correlation among funds in stock trading and that herding 
intensifies when managers trade large market capitalization stocks. Results of the 
Granger causality test showed that pension fund administrators that merged with or were 
acquired by other funds pursued the same strategies as the three industry leaders 
(Cuprum, Habitat and Provida) or the industry benchmark with a one-lag period. The 
  56increase in the time horizon to calculate minimum rates of return in 1999 from 12 to 36 
months is considered a regulatory improvement, but Olivares did not find changes in the 
asset allocation behavior of managers when the two different settings were compared. 
 
The creation of multi-funds in Chile in 2002 was expected to open more room for 
portfolio differentiation and lessen herding in the system. This would result from the fact 
that more choices were given to managers and that an administrator would be able to 
offset a lower rate of return in one fund by a higher return in another fund, decreasing 
switching by members even if the first fund under-performed. Herding across 
administrators diminished in the early stages of the multi-fund scheme, but shortly 
reasserted itself (IMF and World Bank 2004). 
 




Asset  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Government Bonds    33.3     30.4     25.2     19.8     12.4     11.0       9.3  
Mortgage credit bills    16.6     13.7     11.7       9.4       7.1       5.2       4.6  
Deposit certificates    16.0     16.4     19.2     13.7     19.0     20.4     17.2  
Domestic corporate shares    10.7       9.8       9.1     13.4     14.8     13.8     16.1  
Domestic corporate bonds      3.8       6.5       7.9       8.1       7.0       6.8       7.8  
Foreign mutual funds      8.9       8.6     11.9     18.1     24.7     20.8     24.3  
 
(b) Standard Deviation 
Asset  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Government Bonds      5.6       2.8       4.3       2.5       2.0       1.2       1.7  
Mortgage credit bills      3.4       2.1       1.4       1.4       1.7       1.8       1.2  
Deposit certificates      6.1       4.0       6.3       3.3       2.5       3.1       4.8  
Domestic corporate shares      1.3       0.4       0.7       0.6       0.8       0.7       1.6  
Domestic corporate bonds      1.6       1.5       1.9       1.5       1.5       0.9       0.6  
Foreign mutual funds      0.6       0.6       1.1       3.0       1.6       1.1       2.9  
   
Source: Based on data from SAFP. 
 
Appendix 8. Two Crisis and their Impacts on Investments of Pension Funds
69 
 
(a)  The Mexican crisis of 1994-1995: The “Tequila crisis” is linked to the 
Mexican Peso devaluation of December 1994, followed by a banking collapse that saw 
more than half of the nation’s loans written off. After the crisis, Mexican authorities 
followed conservative economic policies to bring inflation and the public sector deficit 
under control. Its aftermath produced some economic reforms, which included the social 
security reform through the introduction of a private pension fund system in 1997 
designed to promote private savings. Pension funds have experienced a rapid growth in 
their asset base and the majority of their investments have been in government securities. 
This is mostly due to the investment regime in the country – an extreme cautious setting 
that allowed for investments in equities only in 2005. As a result, pension funds have 
been key elements in boosting the demand for government debt, underpinning the 
recovery of the public debt market after the crisis. 
 
                                                 
69 Based on Mander (2005) and Fernandez et al. (2007). 
  57(b) The Argentinean crisis of 2001-2002: At the end of 2000, Argentina presented 
serious financial problems. In spite of attempts to rescue sovereign debt, the crisis could 
not be avoided and the “mega-exchange” was implemented in mid-2001 in an effort to 
reduce the financial needs of the government, capitalizing interests and extending the 
maturity of debt. Pension funds were key in the process of managing the crisis and, in 
2002, the share of government bonds in the total portfolio of pension funds reached 
around 80 percent. This was a consequence of a series of events. In November 2001, 
PFAs entered the exchange that converted government bonds into guaranteed loans in an 
attempt to help to avoid sovereign default. After that, the government compulsorily made 
pension funds invest in a short-term bond, which represented 10 percent of their 
portfolios at the end of 2004. At the beginning of 2002, default of sovereign debt was 
followed by currency devaluation, the pesification of dollar deposits, and the pesification 
of sovereign debt under domestic legislation. Despite the increase in nominal valuation, 
almost the whole portfolio of government bonds was in default. Only one of the pension 
fund managers formally accepted the pesification of its portfolio of government bonds, 
while the others reverted to the original bonds and participated in the global restructuring 
process, despite the warning from the government that this would result in worse terms 
than those initially offered for guaranteed loans. In the process of sovereign debt 
renegotiation, a special bond was designed for pension funds (the quasi-par bond), which 
matures in 2045 and represents around 70 percent of their total holding of government 
bonds. These bonds were valued at face value and there was no secondary market where 
they could be negotiated. The portfolios of pension funds were normalized in 2005 since 
all PFAs participated in the debt exchange. 
 




The first pillar of the Australian pension system presents a wide coverage, 
offering benefits equal to 25 percent of the average wage financed with revenues from the 
central government. The mandatory second pillar was introduced in 1993, requiring 9 
percent of workers’ salaries to be deposited in their individual accounts. The assets under 
management by the private pension system are equivalent to about 100 percent of GNP 
and, in total, there are 307 trustee entities managing around 1,000 pension funds. 
 
The system’s regulation is based on fiduciary responsibility of trustees. The 
formal risk-based supervision model, introduced in October 2002, is implemented by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), which also supervises the banking 
and the insurance sectors. The main drivers of this regulatory development were: (a) 
structural organization changes in APRA, (b) the small number of fund failures, and (c) 
regulatory concerns about both incomplete compliance with conduct rules and poor 
governance standards. The primary goal of this model is to ensure that pension entities 
meet the “financial promises” made to their members and beneficiaries and it applies to 
DC and DB pension funds, covering a broad range of institutions in terms of size and 
complexity. 
 
                                                 
70 Based on Brunner et al. (2006). 
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The model provides a structured methodology, covering all types of regulated 
financial institutions, that addresses the magnitude of potential impacts and the 
probability of financial failure. The model employs the Probability and Impact Rating 
System (PAIRS) to select, rate, and weight factors that determine the overall probability 
of fund failure. The PAIRS framework was adapted for DC pension funds taking into 
account that solvency was not a problem and the assessment of net risk is, thus, limited to 
the inherent risk management and control. In the case of DB pension funds, capital 
support is important, since they involve an assessment of the surplus or deficit position of 
the fund, while incorporating an assessment of support from the plan sponsor. Between 
2004 and 2006, the risk-based supervision framework was revised. The main elements of 
this revised structure were: (a) the licensing of all trustees and registration of all funds, 
(b) widening of reporting obligations for fund auditors, and (c) the introduction of five 
new prudential measures regarding fitness and propriety of trustees, risk management 
strategies and plans, outsourcing of trustee information, available resources to trustees, 
and capital adequacy. 